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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is structured around two main and interwoven assumptions operating at two levels. 
On the one level the external dimension of secwio/ threat in Southern Africa is assumed to be the 
most critical factor for regional renewal and stability. It hinges on pertinent regional issues such 
as negative trade balances, economic dependence, poverty, unemployment, poor economic 
growth rates and so forth. The corollary of this assumption is that within the ~operative 
framework of SADC, Southern African states are assumed capable of effectively integrating their 
economies through trade and related arrangements with dominant external actors in the highly 
competitive global economy. The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are used as 
the focal points for illumination. A structured interaction between SADC and the EU within a 
revised North-South framework of interaction is hypothesized and critically examined. On the 
other hand, SADC-US interactions are assessed within the context of the new US Africa policy. 
At another level, the assumption is also made that the post-apartheid democratic state possesses 
both the political will and the wherewithal to provide regiol].al Leadership. This latter assumption 
is put to test within the framework of South Africa's regional foreign policy. 
Adopting an explicit regional unit of analysis, the study utilizes international regime theory as the 
theoretical and conceptual point of departure. The realist conception of the international system 
and the underlying assumptions usually considered as obstacles to international cooperation are 
critically examined in the context of the post-Cold War expanded security agenda. Regime theory 
is used to provide insight on the motivations that lead states to cooperate in situations of mutual 
dilemma by institutionalizing patterns of interaction at the regional and international systemic 
levels. Interstate economic relations at these levels are explained as state actions that are 
influenced by certain norms and that such norm-governed behaviour is wholly consistent 
with the pursuit of n'ltional interest. Application of the theory explains why such foreign policy 
-' 
behaviour of states is particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era. 
The thesis has argued that SADC states are capable of conducting a coordinated trade foreign 
11 
policy in which regional positions are elaborated and adopted. It is argued further that a regional 
capacity to institute trade and economic policies that reflect local circumstances (necessary for 
effective integration with the world economy) calls for strong regional developmental 
democracies in the tradition of social market eC9I~omy. Regional leadership by South Africa is 
considered indispensable where Sbuth Africa must find a sustainable balance between its 
national and regional interests. 
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TO ISABELLA AHSANTE EMANG AND'KIMBERLEY WANJIRU WITH HOPE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY FOREIGN POLICY 
BEHAVIOUR: THE CASE OF TRADE WITH EXTERNAL ACTORS 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
At anyone period or historical juncture, states or governments have pursued various goals such 
as security, prestige, autonomy and welfare. These goals are prioritized depending on various 
domestic and international constraints. In the post-apartheid and post-Cold War period, security 
has increasingly been defined in economic terms. It has been argued (Buzan 1991: 99) that weak 
states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political 
power, leaving them underdeveloped and politically penetrated and their efforts to mobilize 
economic and political resources to build a stronger state co~strained. In Southern Africa this 
reality has generated economic dependence, negative trade balances, unemplo~ent: poor 
economic growth rates, poverty, debt crises, economic disparities and so forth. These are 
serious threats to security and stability in the region and are exacerbated by pervasiveness of 
global capitalism through the processes of economic globalization. The external dimension of 
security threat in Southern Africa is therefore a critical factor for the survival of the regi<21! as a 
whole. Yet to minimize this threat, states in the region have little choice but to integrate with the 
highly competitive global economy. Therefore, for the economically vulnerable and politically 
weak states of Southern Africa, economic progress is a major priority issue. To increase their 
wealth and economic efficiency, these states must develop innovative ways to effectively engage 
in international trade. As such, there are choices to be made as well as options to be adopted. 
--
This thesis examines the question whether Southern African states within the framework of 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) are capable of effectively integrating their 
economies through trade and related arrangements with the highly competitive global economy. 
In this endeavour, the role of South Africa (SA) as the region's economic powerhouse and 
partner within SADC cooperative framework is critically assessed. The European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US) , as the two most dominant actors within the global economy, are 
used as the focal point for illumination. 
The study is conducted within the framework of international regime theory as a theoretical 
construct to explain interstate relations. The study begins by using the framework as a tool to 
examine the motivations that lead states to cooperate in situations of mutual dilemma by 
institutionalizing patterns of interaction. Obstacles to cooperation posed -by the realist 
conception of the international system and the units (states) of interaction within it are 
challenged by a critical examination of the underlying tenets of realism. The argument advanced 
is that cooperation among sovereign states in an anarchic world without a supreme authority is 
still possible. That is, egoistic self-interested state behaviour does not necessarily inhibit 
cooperation because states are more interested in the pursuit of their own welfare in a world that 
is increasingly interdependent. The result of this has been the development by states of 
cooperative institutions such as the Frontline States, Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), SADC, EU and so forth.-Theeoncept of regime is also used 
to explain region to region cooperative arrangements such as SADC-US Forum and SAQC-EU 
post-Lome Convention arrangement currently under discussion. 
Using a historical perspective, chapter three places Southern African region in its historical 
socio-politico-economic reality. The genesis and evolution of cooperative behaviour in Southern 
African region is critically reviewed for the purpose of tracing the historical determimmts of 
cooperation among the states-of the region. The implications of these on the current patterns of 
cooperation are drawn out to provide insight on the depth, the pace and the general direction of 
present collaborative efforts under the SADC regime. Specific emphasis is placed on the role of 
the post-apartheid democratic South Africa in the SADC efforts to find and implement 
innovative strategies to reconstruct regional economic relations for regional renewal and 
-' 
stability as well as for effective positioning in the global economy. 
In Chapter Four a systematic and structured interaction between SADC and the EU within a 
revised and selective North-South framework is hypothesized. The view considered is that the 
presence of the post-apartheid democratic state in its ranks as partner, SADC will have the 
wherewithal to conduct a systematic foreign policy activity on trade and related matters towards 
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the EU. That is, South Africa's middle power status and the current international goodwill it 
enjoys, coupled with its position as the regional linchpin and gateway to Southern Africa for 
trade and foreign investment, all serve to strengthen the subregion's attractiveness to the ED. The 
cohesiveness of the subregion and its relative stability coupled with its vast natural wealth will 
strengthen its joint positions on specific issue areas on trade matters. The chapter begins with an 
assessment of the post-Cold War era as the global economic reality in which SADC states must 
interact with the dominant global actors. The implications on SADC r states of specific 
characteristics of this reality such as the decline on real spending on development assistance, 
emphasis on trade rather than aid and reciprocity in trade rather than non-reciprocity are 
assessed. In this context the merits and demerits of the Lome Convention are reviewed and 
conclusions drawn about the Convention's relevance as a model for North-South cooperation. 
The recently signed SA-EU trade pact is also assessed and its implications on SADC-EU future 
trade interactions drawn out. 
Chapter Five explores further the possibility that SADC' s inno-vatlv-e interactions with dominant 
external actors could result in beneficial outcomes. The US is used as the focal point for 
illumination. The centrality of the US in the global political economy is emphasized. SADC-US 
interactions are examined within the understanding that the US constitutes a huge export market 
and is potentially a source of economic assistance in the form of trade and investment deals and 
associated accommodations. The focus of the analysis is the new US Africa policy. Parti~ular 
attention is directed towards a critical assessment of the US African Growth and Opportunity 
Act bill as a central instrument of this policy. The bill's inherent conditienalities are placed in 
the context of the attempt by SADC states to develop a capacity to institute trade and economic 
policies that reflect local circumstances. In regard to this, conclusions are drawn about the 
appropriate form of political economy for SADC states as a whole. The special US interest in 
South Africa is used to"stress the centrality of South Africa's role in any major SADC contacts 
with the dominant global economic actors. 
The recurrent theme in the previous chapters of South Africa's centrality in SADC contacts with 
the two dominant actors is itself the object of analysis in Chapter Six. The key question being 
addressed here is the willingness of South Africa to act the role of the regional leader. That 
willingness or the lack thereof is assessed in terms of specific policy pronouncements and more 
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critically in tenns of substantive behaviour of the region's economic powerhouse towards its 
economically weaker neighbours. The assessment is conducted within the context of South 
Africa's regional foreign policy. 
This thesis argues that effective integration of SADC states with the global economy through 
effective international trade has the potential to sustain regional renewal towards longtenn 
stability. However, this will require the coordination of policies on a regioBal platfonn to 
strengthen collective or joint positions on trade and related matters and to institute regional 
political economies with the capacity to mitigate the inescapable insecurities (for example, 
massive inequalities) inherent within global capitalism of market-based relations. The 
leadership role of South Africa in this endeavour will be indispensable. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
International Regime: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework for Analysis in 
International Relations 
In this study, regime concept is used as a theoretical point of departure to illustrate cooperation 
among SADC states and to assess SADC's relations on trade and related matters with two key 
external actors. Essentially the thesis attempts to explore the more general question regarding the 
ability or otherwise of Southern African countries to relate effectively (that is in a manner more 
beneficial to Southern Africa) on matters of trade and related issues with a select group of 
economically rich and powerful Northern industrialized states. 
This question is posed within the new security agenda or new security thinking which accepts a 
broader conceptualization of security both in the post-apartheid regional environment and the 
post-Cold War era. According to Buzan et al (1998), a broad conceptualization of security does 
not only include the state as the referent object of security but also includes its peoples, its 
institutions, its economy and so forth. In this sense, even a supranational entity sucha;;SADC is 
a referent object of security since it can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine 
the rules, norms and institutions that constitute it. As Solomon (1998) argues, the expanded 
security agenda does not altogether ignore the previously dominant paradigm in the realist 
tradition of state-centric military-centered approaches. It does, however, challenge the reC!list 
conceptualization of politics as a zero-sum, relative gains seeking and pure struggle for power. It 
is a view which finds much common ground with the theoretical discourse on complex 
interdependence as expounded by Keohane and Nye (1989). The broad conceptualization of 
security suggests that cooperation among states motivated by pursuit of national interest is still 
possible. The concept <1f international regime is used to provide insights on whether cooperation 
among states in Southern Africa on the one part and between Southern Africa and ext~rnal actors 
on the other is viable for purposes of mutual gain. To do this, the theoretical conceptualization of 
the international system through the realist lens is weighed against the institutionalist (neorealist) 
lens. 
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2.1 Perceived Obstacles to International Cooperation 
Realism as a conceptual framework for analysis of the international system and of the behaviour 
of states within that system is seen as the main stumbling block by those who favour 
international cooperation. From its classical setting (Smith 1986; Viotti and Kauppi 1993) 
realism equates the international system to primordial relations of man in an anarchic 
environment (state of nature) which is characterized by "war of all against a1p,.:1 
As Smith (1986:1) notes, the pessimistic view of human nature as one characterized by the 
struggle for power in a social setting is realism's most basic outline of world politics. In realist 
view and thought the struggle for power is a permanent condition which no social arrangement 
can eradicate (Smith 1986: 1). In the view of Morgenthau (1966:25) international politics, like all 
politics, is a struggle for power and that whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, 
power is always the immediate aim. 
Within the framework of such a conceptualization, the likelihood of international cooperation is 
perceived to be impossible and at best minimal. The rationale for this conceptualization'is based 
on several realist assumptions. Using the assumption of anarchy, realists argue (Viotti and 
Kauppi 1993 :48) that as there is a hierarchy of power in international politics and no hierarchy of 
authority, states seek to maintain or increase their power positions relative to other states. The 
further assumption that national security is of the highest value among issues in world politics 
has meant that states must seek security where prudence dictates a necessary focus on relative 
gains (Waltz 1979). !n line with this argument the need for state survivatplaces military security 
or strategic issues (high politics) above social and economic issues (low politics ). As such, 
states are assumed to be in a permanent struggle or competition for power within the 
international system in which they are also assumed to be the principal or dominant actors. Non-
state actors such as multinational corporations, interna~,onal organizations and other 
lThis conception is influenced by Hobbes's view of the international state of nature as a state of war in 
which states as autonomous sovereign entities have no power or authority above them and are responsible only to 
themselves. In this environment of permanent conflict, states maximize their own security (Smith 1986: 13). 
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transnational non-state actors are considered less influential and therefore less important. 
There is the further assumption that the state is a unitary and rational actor. As a rational actor the 
state makes decisions objectively in terms of existmg capabilities. For realists (Viotti and Kauppi 
1993 :6), it matters less that decisions arrived at in this manner may produce sUboptimal results as 
that they are at least satisfactory or good enough in terms of the objectives sought. When foreign 
policy behaviour of states is conceptualized in this manner the result is the creatio~ of zero-sum 
conditions that significantly minimize prospects for cooperation. 
Realists especially focus on the condition of anarchy in the international system as being central 
to any endeavor of cooperation. Prospects for cooperation are affected at all times by the 
possibility of defection. Lack of trust in the condition of anarchy creates uncertainty for the future 
and as such even international agreements and alliances cannot be trusted as guarantees for state 
security and survival or as mediums through which national interest could be maximized. For 
realists, today's friends are tomorrow's enemies. Jeryis (1978:f68tcaptures this fear of the future 
appropriately when he notes, "minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can 
shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise". This implies that states fear that other states will 
not honor agreements. There is perpetual fear of the future and fear of defection which acts to 
limit possibilities for cooperation. Even in situations where interdependence among states might 
exist, realist have remained skeptical in their view about international cooperation. They argue 
(Viotti and Kauppi 1993:56) that interdependence implies a degree of vulnerability of one state 
to another in a dominance-dependence relationship where the dependent party is vulnerable to 
the choices of the dominant party. For realists (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 57) dependency on 
others is to be minimized, whereas dependency of others on one's own state is desirable as it 
increases one's leverage over those other states. This perception disregards the possibility of a 
cooperative situation in which states would establish rules and procedures for regulating 
interdependence among them. 
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For realists, cooperation if at all possible may occur only in the non-military strategic sphere. 
This is because a clear distinction is made between military-political strategic issues and 
economic issues where the latter (low politics) are relatively less important. Within the realist 
framework of thought, hegemonic stability theory is: used to explain emergence of cooperative 
regimes in the domain of low politics. As young (1982) argues, regimes emerging under this 
framework of thought must be understood in terms of power and are therefore imposed regimes. 
Such regimes simply represent the realist posture of relative gains seeking strategy since coercion 
and manipulation by the hegemon is involved both in the creation and maintenance of the 
regimes. In this sense such regimes can be said to be suboptimal arrangements and also in the 
sense that absolute gains considerations are ignored. 
2.2 Regimes and International Relations 
In contrast to the realist perspective, neorealists view the international system differently. While 
accepting the condition of anarchy in the international system, they-i"'eject the notion that 
cooperation is not possible. Neorealists make the assumption (SnidalI991) that in an anarchic 
world without a central authority to enforce agreements, egoistic self-interested state behaviour 
does not necessarily inhibit cooperation since states are more interested in the pursuit of their 
own welfare. The pursuit of state welfare means that maximizing absolute gains is important 
irrespective of the fact that the gains might be asymmetrical (SnidalI991). It is argued that this 
scenario represents the real world more frequently. 
Neorealist have used the concept of regime to show that cooperation among sovereign states in 
an anarchic world is still possible. Their approach is also state-centric but it accepts the 
significant role of non-state actors in the international system. Proponents of this view such as 
Keohane (1984, 1982); Young (1986, 1982); Krasner (1~~2) and Stein (1982) contend that 
regimes are significant in international relations. The basic argument in this orientation IS that in 
certain specific issue-areas the need for cooperation among states via a framework of policy 
collaboration arises as a means to cope with circumstances of common threats or problems. It is 
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also an argument increasingly being informed by such concepts as complex interdependence 
even though regime proponents have treated states as unified, rational actors (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987:492). Moreover, the expanded concept of security in the post-Cold War era 
increases the relevance of attempts by states to establish various forms of cooperative schemes. 
Regimes are defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of intematitmal relations" 
(Krasner 1982: 186). There is an element of overlap and inter-relatedness between principles, 
norms and rules. For instance, principles, which are explained (Haggard and Simmons 1987:493) 
as beliefs of fact and causation as well as correctness of judgement, tend to shade off into norms. 
Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. On the other hand, Haggard and Simmons (1987:493) 
note that norms are difficult to distinguish from rules. Decision-making procedures are explained 
(Krasner 1982: 186) as prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 
Within a regime, convergence of actor expectations is underpiIUled4JY the concept of reciprocity 
as an important principle in a continuous process of interaction. Jervis (1982:357) argues that in a 
successful regime the concept of reciprocity implies a form of cooperation that is IIlore than the 
following of short-run self interest. It is this aspect which distinguishes regimes from agreements 
where the latter are seen as ad hoc or one-shot arrangements. Therefore principles and norms 
(Krasner 1982: 187) remain the basic defining characteristics of a regime since there are many 
rules and decision-making procedures that are consistent with the same principles and norms. As 
such, Krasner (1982:187-188) notes, changes inrules and decision-making,Procedures are 
changes within a regime that continues to exist, while changes in principles and norms are 
changes of the regime itself. 
As Haggard and Simmoll'S (1987 :492) observe, regime p:?ponents, unlike realists, posit that 
patterns of state action are influenced by norms and that such norm-governed behaviour IS wholly 
consistent with the pursuit of national interest. The literature on regime emergence and 
transformation is grouped into four categories: structural, game-theoretic, functional and 
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cognitive. The fIrst three are state-centered in the sense that they assume unified rational actors. It 
is important to note (Haggard and Simmons 1987:498) at the outset that all four categories are 
not mutually exclusive since most interpretations tend to draw from more than one theoretical 
approach. We focus on game-theoretic and function.al theories of regimes to provide insight on 
cooperation in Southern Africa and the envisaged cooperation between Southern Africa and 
external actors. To some extent game-theoretic and functional theories of regimes draw from the 
neorealism of the Grotian perspective.2 
Game theoretic approach explains how unifIed, rational state actors are capable of achieving 
cooperation in an anarchic international system. Regime theorists use a variation of the two actor 
one-shot prisoners' dilemma game to illustrate this. It is therefore important fIrst to show how the 
two actor one-shot prisoners' dilemma game illustrates the dilemma of common interests and 
how that is circumvented in the domestic domain. The dilemma of common interests is said to 
arise (Stein 1982:304) when independent decision making results in equilibrium outcomes that 
are Pareto-defIcient (that is outcomes in which actors prefer another given outcome to the 
equilibrium outcome). 
The concept of dilemma of common interests presents the state of nature as a prisoners' dilemma 
in which (Stein 1982:306) rational, self-interested individuals have a dominant strategy of 
defecting from common action but in which the results of the mutual defection is defIcient for 
all. The prisoners' dilemma depicts this problem by using a two actor, one-shot game in whiCh 
the actors face the choice of either defecting or cooperating. The actors h~veno information 
about the choice the other party might make and there is the assumption that their actions are 
guided by individual strategic rationality. The result is that the actors dominant individual 
strategy leads them to defect. As stein argues (1982:301), in this situation defection is inevitable 
2 A Grotian perspective towards anarchy of international relations differs markedly from that dl!picted by 
Hobbes or Machiavelli. Grotius, a contemporary of Hobbes, argued that values or norms are important in 
maintaining order among states especially when recognized as forming international law and accepted by states as 
binding. This tradition of thought has to some extent influenced regime theorists. 
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as long as behaviour results from unconstrained and independent decision making. This is 
commonly stipulated to be a representation of international anarchy. In the domestic state of 
nature this problem is overcome by collaboration whereby (Stein 1982:307) individuals' 
common interest lead them to fonn domestic political regimes (establishment of the state as a 
supreme authority) to constrain the free rein of their individuality and independent rationality 
and to provide security and order among other things. 
In contrast to the realist position, regime theorists have argued (Krasner 1982: 186) that this 
domestic arrangement can be achieved at the level of the international state of nature (the 
anarchic international system) in specific issue areas under certain constrained conditions 
involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes (outcomes that are 
non zero-sum because actors show preference for negotiation whereby all benefit). Strategic 
game theorists, Axelrod (1984), Snidal (1991) and Stein (1982) have argued that cooperation is 
possible even among egoistic self-interest maximizers in an anarchic setting.3 Their view adopts 
an interest-oriented perspective of the fonnation and maintenance of international regimes. 
Using a variation of the prisoners' dilemma game, they start off with the position that one-shot, 
two actor game is not representative of real-life state interactions. They therefore use an iterated 
prisoners' dilemma game where interactions are repeated many times over. Lack of trust and 
uncertainty for the future, a feature common in the realist relative-gains seeking postures~ ~s 
mitigated by the fact that actors interact frequently. Drawing from Keohane's (1984) functionalist 
view, the argument is that states take the future into consideration when they encounter each 
other more than once. In this sense cooperation is promoted and a regime is established to lower 
transaction costs, reduce uncertainty and extend the shadow ofthe future. Arguing that relative 
gains in game theory do not inhibit cooperation to nearly the extent suggested by realist theorists, 
Snidal (1991 :387) posits that as the number of actors increases, relative gains become 
3 As used here, Krasner (1982:195) defines egoistic self-interest as the desire to maximize one's own utility 
function where that function does not include the utility of another party, except that the egoist is concerned with 
the behaviour of others only insofar as that behaviour can affect the egoist's utility. 
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increasingly irrelevant to the prospects for cooperation. 
Cooperation in Southern Africa and elsewhere would seem to support this view. SADC is 
currently made up of fourteen member states. This number compares well with that of the 
European Union membership before the recent expansions. Simply put, this suggests that 
cooperation is more feasible as actors increase in a multilateral setting. However, the appropriate 
multilateral setting is one in which states share common characteristics such as ~common cultural, 
historical and economic legacy. SADC membership, as indeed that of the European Union, is 
largely comprised of states with such intrinsic links. Snidal (1991 :399) argues that a multilateral 
setting for cooperation is useful because it substantially reduces the assurance problem since the 
defection of a single actor would not mean a regime breakdown. This would suggest that 
cooperation among SADC states is founded on firm ground. Numbers are therefore important as 
the case of the defunct East African Community members, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, would 
suggest. 
It is emphasized (Stein 1982:301) that regimes arise not because states' choices are . 
circumscribed but because states eschew independent decision-making in favour of joint decision 
making. This results in a patterned behaviour suggesting that participants are responding to 
certain principles and norms and adhering to certain rules and procedures. This view of regime 
emergence does not contest the fact that power and anarchy are important variables. Rat?~r, it is 
argued (Keohane and Nye 1989) that regimes affect states' perceptions of anarchy and power and 
therefore influence their foreign policy behaviour towards other states. ' 
This argument implies that international regimes, as intervening variables, enable states to 
consider the inherent possibilities of maximizing their interest (seen in terms of welfare and 
-" 
hence absolute gains) through cooperative arrangements. This helps to overcome the obstacle to 
cooperation caused by the perception that states pursue only relative gains. This interest-based 
perspective to regime formation is especially relevant in circumstances in which states have to 
cope, as Young (1986) argues, with such situations as security dilemmas, common interests 
12 
dilemma, trade wars and so forth. In such a world, Keohane and Nye (1989) point out, costly 
interdependence among states exist. Costly interdependence implies costly transactional costs. 
Rittberger (1995:9) argues that such costs can be alleviated by institutionalized cooperation 
which enables states to escape inefficiencies of self-help strategies.4 
2.3 Regimes and Interdependence 
In terms of a broadened security agenda, Buzan (1991: 19) identifies five sources of security 
threats to human collectivities: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. These 
five dimensions of security are interrelated and for Southern Africa, as indeed elsewhere, they 
cannot be confined to national boundaries. As such, national security defined in a 
multidimensional sense cannot be separated from regional security. SADC states are mindful of 
the need to approach the question of security as an integrated and regional project. Accordingly, 
the overall SADC framework has addressed economic security concerns via the SADC Trade 
Protocol of 1996 and traditional politico-military concerns under the Organ on Politics, Defense 
and Security. It can be said that this integrated approach to security is informedby th~need to 
redefine the concept of security in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era. More important, 
however, is the question of prioritization of issues for policy focus but not in the traditional sense 
of a rigid hierarchical classification whereby military security issues (high politics) predominate. 
Rather, we mean prioritization in terms of urgency. 
A broadened security agenda implies an increase of issue areas requiring policy focus. For the 
state this also means an increase of contact points with other actors and other states alike. As a 
result, an environment characterized by a web of interdependence has become a prominent 
feature of global as well as regional relations. This is captured well in Keohane and Nye's 
4In cooperation theory, a self-help strategy among states is considered anarchic and Pareto sub-optimal. It 
is motivated by the fear for survival. Such fear conditions states' behaviour and works against their cooperation. 
"Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order" (Waltz 1979: 111). In a self-help system, 
considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest. For a thorough treatment of this idea see 
Kenneth N. Waltz 1979, Theory ofIntemational Politics. New York: Random House. 
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(1989:8) definition of interdependence in world politics as referring situations characterized by 
reciprocal costly effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In a highly 
interdependent world in which a rigid hierarchy of issues is absent, the trend has been to focus on 
the issues that seem to command immediate attentio;. As a result, prioritization in terms of 
urgency has resulted in the overwhelming focus on economic affairs and other social issues (low 
politics) in the post-Cold War era. 
Against this background of interdependence, regimes are becoming increasingly relevant. For 
instance, visible attempts by states to cooperate in economic and security affairs has 
characterized the last decade of the millennium. Cooperative outcomes in specific issue-areas 
have been increasingly sought by states both at the international and regional systemic levels. 
The defining characteristic underpinning the search for cooperative outcomes at these two levels 
has been an overwhelming focus on economic affairs as opposed to military affairs. At the 
international level, the transformation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the conclusion ofthe Uruguay Round in 1995 
witnessed a general marked increase in trade liberalization in the world. At the regional ~evel the 
decade has witnessed closer European economic integration culminating into a single market and 
currency for Western Europe under the auspices of the European Union as an economic trading 
bloc. Another development was the formation of an economic grouping between United States, 
Mexico and Canada, namely the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA) of 1993~!~ . 
Africa, the Southern African region has regrouped itself around SADC. Elsewhere on the 
continent as well as in Asia and Latin America similar developments are evident. 
These regional regroupings are not accidental. Rather, it can be argued, they represent deliberate 
and purposive cooperative efforts by states to coordinate their economic policies for mutual gain 
in the face of what they perceive as common problems. Such collaboration by states results into 
the development of cooperative regimes to enable coordination of policy on specific issue-areas 
such as trade at the regional as well as the international level. SADC is viewed in this study as 
comprising a cooperative framework within which the region can deal with the various aspects of 
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economic interdependencies especially in the case of trade with external actors. In this regard, the 
political and economic dimensions of security are important because international trade relations 
are complex interactions involving political and economic matters simultaneously. This is more 
so the case given the unprecedented development of economic globalization in the post-Cold 
War global political economy. As so far indicated, regime theory coupled with the need for 
reconceptualization of security threat provides useful insight on how states may form cooperative 
~ - ~ 
frameworks for dealing with emergent new threats collectively. 
Our focus is clearly on the interest-based conception of regime emergence. This approach 
approximates more closely to the reality of the contemporary world order in which explicitly 
power-based approaches to international relations have receded. Therefore we view the SADC 
cooperative arrangement as a perfect example of an interest-based arrangement in which coercion 
or manipulation by more dominant actors within it is absent. Cooperative arrangements such as 
SADC represent what regime theorists have called negotiated regimes or orders. Young 
(1982:283) notes that negotiated orders emerge as a product of ~onicious efforts to agree on their 
major provisions, explicit consent on the part of individual participants, and the formal. 
expression of the results. Keohane (1982) calls this the "demand side"for regime creation as it 
explains the desire or willingness on the part of governments to establish international regimes to 
cope with the competitiveness, uncertainty and conflict of interests in world politics. It can be 
said that these type of regimes are the most common at the international level whereby exp!i~it 
bargaining processes are undertaken. Both the GATT arrangement and the EU-South Africa Free 
Trade Agreement concluded in March 1999 are good examples of negotiated regimes. 
In contrast to negotiated regimes, imposed regimes do not typically involve explicit consent on 
the part of subordinate actors. Young (1982:284) posits that imposed orders are fostered 
deliberately by a dominant power or a consortia of dominant actors where compliance is obtained 
by several means involving coercion, cooptation and manipulation of incentives. Certain versions 
of hegemonic stability theory have explained cooperation in these terms. In Southern Africa, an 
example of an imposed regime is the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) as 
15 
attempted by the erstwhile apartheid state a decade a go. To a lesser extent, the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU) also fits this description and as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 
(1998: 181) observe, it is being renegotiated in order to reflect a more balanced and mutually 
beneficial arrangement. 
Despite the apparent clear distinction between negotiated and imposed regimes, it is nevertheless 
important to point out that these regime typologies are not exactly mutually exclusi.ve. Therefore, 
while SADC is clearly not an imposed regime, the role of South Africa as the most economically 
and militarily powerful member in the regime remains a crucial factor in terms of the regime 
stability, maintenance and persistence. Essentially, South Africa is viewed in this study not only 
as a cooperating partner within the framework of SADC but also as the undisputed regional 
leader given its status as the most dominant actor in the region. As mentioned earlier, dealing 
with dilemmas of common interests implies dealing with costly interdependence. Given South 
Africa's economic and technological superiority, there is the inevitability of asymmetric 
distribution of benefits and costs associated with interdependent regional relations. In such a 
setting, disputes involving conflict of interest on a number of issues would not be uncommon. 
For instance, there are well known trade disputes (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1995) 
involving South Africa and Zimbabwe on the one part and South Africa and Botswana on the 
other. With Zimbabwe the dispute is on textile trade where South Africa enjoys more benefits of 
the uneven trade between them. In the case of South Africa and Botswana the dispute involves 
the latter's assembly ofhyundai cars targeting the South African market. There has also been· 
disputes (dividing SADC membership into two camps) over the management and nature of 
institutionalization of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security. SADC, as an international 
regime has a clear role to play in restraining and managing such conflictual relations to prevent 
them from becoming major conflicts. Simultaneously, South Africa, as the key player in the 
region, is expected to bring its influence to bear within a leadership capacity where leadership 
need not imply dominance. 
At the international level and within SADC cooperative framework, South Africa's leadership 
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role is even more critical. At this level, asymmetric distribution of benefits and costs associated 
with instances of complex interdependence is even much higher than at the regional level. There 
is also the problem of regional vulnerability to the forces of global capitalism. A regional 
platform for bargaining and negotiation with externaJ ~ctors is therefore necessary. In this study, 
SADC is viewed as the appropriately constituted platform within which the regional states can 
elaborate their joint positions on matters of trade and related issues when dealing with external 
actors. That is, negotiated regimes can be developed between SADC and domil!-antglobal actors 
such as the EU and the US. For instance, it is envisaged that an economic arrangement (that is, a 
negotiated regime) similar to the EU-South Africa Free Trade Agreement of March 1999, but 
allowing for more asymmetry and differentiation in recognition of level of development 
differential, can be elaborated between SADC and the EU and SADC and the US. The point that 
is important to stress here is that whether at the regional (inter-state relations in Southern Africa) 
or the international level (SADC relations with other actors), increased interdependence will 
motivate states to develop cooperative frameworks to manage their relations for mutual benefit. 
Van Aardt (1998: 107) argues that this translates into sharing of sovereignty whereby it is 
- -
enhanced by means of diminishing it. That is, states give up certain competencies in order to 
strengthen themselves collectively by increasing regional strength to enable achievement of 
certain goals and objectives. 
2.4 Conclusion 
We have argued that the expanded security agenda in the post-apartheid post-Cold War 
dispensation reveals that conceptualization of politics as a zero sum, relative gains seeking and 
pure struggle for power is outdated. It is not inevitable that states remain self-seeking agents 
always attempting to maximize their short term individual or self interests. The level of 
interdependence in the present Liberal International Economic Order ameliorates the condition of 
anarchy by elevating the concept of reciprocity. 
In a world of complex interdependence relative power position in the realist perspective is not 
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beneficial. As such, the realist world of power politics within a rigid international structure 
independent of the wishes and actions of statesmen is guiding policy formulations less and less. 
Rather, in a broadened conceptualization of security and within a framework of complex 
interdependence, the structure of the system, regional o,r international, can influence states 
operating in it as much as states can influence it.. Accordingly, in an international system in 
which politico-military issues have lost prominence, the elevated importance of socio-economic 
issues has come to mean increased levels of interdependence and reciprocity. This has led to a 
corresponding increase in the demand for governance structures or regimes as necessary 
intermediate mechanisms for collective management of a high density of issues. In this setting, a 
rigid hierarchy of power or of issues in international politics is minimal or absent. National 
security is redefined to include regional security and interests. This is a relevant perception in 
Southern Africa where even the most powerful regional state ( South Africa) views its long term 
stability as being inextricably linked to that of the region as a whole. 
Cooperation in economic and security affairs (embracing of expand~cLsecurity agenda) has 
therefore come to increasingly characterize affairs of states. The SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defense and Security and the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) 
are politico-military cooperative structures within larger cooperative frameworks addressing 
socio-economic issues. This development demonstrates that a rigid dichotomy between politico-
military strategic issues and socio-economic issues has become irrelevant. Our analysis of regime 
concept within the framework of the post-Cold War Liberal International Economic Order 
suggests that this trend has now become irreversible. 
The trend confirms the enduring relevance of cooperative regimes among and between states. It 
is a manifestation of the fact that even in an anarchic world without a central authority, the 
pursuit of state welfare to.maximize absolute gains (irrespective of asymmetries in the gains) 
remains a powerful incentive to cooperate. Our analysis of regime concept further suggests that 
patterned state behaviour emerges as states respond to certain principles, norms, rules and 
procedures. This occurs in an environment whereby in specific issue areas states voluntarily 
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eschew independent decision-making in favour of joint decision-making because their individual 
interests are jointly served. This study is firmly grounded in this view. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
SADC in Perspective: The Evolution of Cooperative Behavior. 
The two extremes of economic debate are autarkic self reliance and international cooperation 
along the lines of unrestricted free trade. Each extreme poses a dilemma. This reality has 
motivated states to form cooperative arrangements to cope with perceived s~curity dilemmas, 
whether these are politico-military or economic based. This is more so the case in an increasingly 
interdependent post-Cold War era. Yet, as Zartman (1971: 5) observes, cooperation always 
poses the problem of domination. For SADC states the problem of domination exists at two 
levels. One is at the local or sub regional level where the strongest state may exhibit a self-
interested behavior at the expense of weaker partners. The second is at the international level 
where?y the negotiating partner such as the EU or the US dominates SADC. Despite the 
potential for domination, groups of states in the contemporary international system continue to 
emerge as actors on the international scene. 
This chapter examines the historical development of cooperative behavior in the Southern 
African region. Two levels of this development are examined up to the point where the two 
merge into one demonstrating mutual compatibility of values. In the one part historical 
determinants of cooperation are assessed using the apartheid state perspective, while in the other 
the perspective of independent Southern African states is used. The final part examines-the 
changed nature of regional security threat within the framework of current patterns of regional 
cooperation. It is argued that despite conflict and confrontation, Southern Africa has had a 
tradition of cooperative behaviour and that historical and current interdependence makes the 
region one that is inextricably linked. It is further argued that the current patterns of regional 
cooperation are attempts to cope with the new set of regional threats which are largely economic 
in nature and having an external dimension. In this setting, the post apartheid state in association 
with the SADC states as partner is perceived as constituting the greatest hope for regional 
renewal, security and stability. 
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3.1 Historical Determinants of Cooperation in the Southern African Region. 
Southern African region is generally regarded as a sub-system of international relations (Zacarias 
1998; Sefali 1985; Davies and O'Meara 1985). As a subsystem, Southern Africa was further 
integrated and consolidated by the mineral discovery in South Africa in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the apartheid system and the liberation struggle against apartheid (Zacarias 
1998: 44). The exploitation of minerals, mainly diamonds and gold, led to the development of the 
capitalist economic complex in Southern Africa. Within the subsystem, the principal poles of 
accumulation were located in South Africa while the neighbouring territories were subordinated 
to serve the needs of capital accumulation in South Africa (Davies and O'Meara 1985: 22). In 
this regard the neighbouring territories served as sources of cheap labour, cheap raw materials 
and as markets for South Africa's manufactured products. This system of unequal exchange and 
devel9pment, exacerbated by economic interactions within the wider global economy, has 
characterised Southern African region for many decades. Economic and political imbalances led 
to a condition of regional instability and constant fears. It can be argued that this development 
constituted the bedrock of conflict and confrontation in the Southern African subsyste~. At the 
same time, this development is responsible for the emergence of cooperative a.ttempts in the 
region informed by contradictory objectives. 
3.1.1 Regional Cooperation in the Perspective of the Sub-Colonial and Apartheid State 
Cooperative efforts in Southern Africa began in the colonial era motiv~ted largely by the same 
considerations that later informed cooperation as seen from the perspective of apartheid South 
Africa. As Sefali (1985) has argued, the development of the economic complex in Southern 
Africa centered around South Africa resulted in South Africa becoming a sub-imperial power. To 
enhance this positiort, Sefali (1985) argues, South A:£!ica's state monopoly capitalism sought to 
intensify integrationist ties between itself and its neighbours. Prior to 1910, South Africa itself 
did not constitute a single and coherent political entity. Rather, it was made up of the two British 
colonies of the Cape and Natal and the two Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free 
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State. It is therefore possible to argue that the 1910 agreement between the British colonies and 
the two Boer republics to form the Union of South Africa constituted the first major cooperative 
effort to integrate and therefore stabilize Southern Africa under the British sub- colonial 
hegemony. Zacarias (1998: 45) notes that this arrangement was extended to include the present 
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho (BLS states, but British Protectorates then) as junior partners 
of South Africa in the 1910 South African dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
In addition, Sefali (1985: 165) notes, preferential trade arrangements were entered into by South 
Africa with the Portuguese colony of Mozambique as well as with the British colony of 
Rhodesia. 
As Sefali (1985: 165) further notes, the over-riding objective of these trade arrangements 
engineered by South Africa was to facilitate the flow of industrial goods from South Africa, as 
the ce~ter or core of accumulation, to the markets of the neighbouring labour-exporting 
peripheries. This was further enhanced by a system of transport and communication controlled 
and centered on South Africa. Despite being heavily steeped-in favour of South Africa these 
arrangements and others that followed laid the foundation for a cooperative culture in ~e 
subregion. For instance, it is worth noting that the preferential trade agreemenfof 1964 between 
South Africa and Rhodesia was kept in place (until it lapsed in 1992) even after the latter became 
independent in 1980. Similarly, following political independence of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland in the mid 1960s SACU was renegotiated in 1969 between the apartheid state and the 
three BLS states. In terms of regime theory, SACU cannot be said to constitute a negotiated 
regime. Explicit bargaining proces·s arid consent on the part of BLS states as participants in the 
regime was not always present. Instead, SACU represents an imposed order maintained by 
hegemonic power of South Africa whereby the hegemon maximizes its interests. This is 
underscored by the observation (SefaE 1985: 166) that under the pretext of protecting new 
industries in the BLS"states, the 1969 agreement unde,r SACU serve South Africa's interests 
more by enabling South Africa's manufacturing sector to monopolise the markets of its 
industrially underdeveloped partners. Despite this fact SACU represents an important example of 
cooperative behaviour in the subregion. 
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Apartheid state's expansionist policy into the BLS states through cooperative arrangements was 
further extended when it established the Rand Monetary Zone in 1974 between itself and 
Swaziland and Lesotho. In effect, Sefali (1985: 166) notes, the South African Reserve Bank 
became the defacto central bank of these independent countries. While this arrangement 
enhanced regional interdependence, it also reflected the level of dependence of these weak states 
to the apartheid state. It remained the ongoing interest of the apartheid state to maintain a high 
level of dependency of the regional states to itself. Mutual agreement on this -ol:5jective with the 
regional independent states was absent. 
The desire to preserve this status quo found explicit expression within the framework ofthe Total 
National Strategy under the Botha regime in 1979. As Davies and O'Meara (1985: 25) note, total 
strategy called for the mobilization of economic, political and psycho-social resources including 
military resources, for the sole purpose of advancing the apartheid states's regional interests. This 
included use of military and economic measures to frustrate attempts by independent regional 
states to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa:- TIre-scheme therefore envisaged a 
coerced form of political and economic collaboration among the states of Southern Africa. A 
. ~~ 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) linked to apartheid state through a range of 
economic projects was seen as the ultimate objective. This was perceived as a necessary step in 
the scheme to enhance South Africa's hegemony in the region where the neighbouring states 
remained dependent and subordinate partners economically and politically. The CONSAS 
scheme failed to attract interest among the independent regional states and instead triggered a 
counter reaction or collaboration in the opposite direction. The neighbo,uring states therefore 
sought to minimize their collective dependence on South Africa. 
It is possible to argue that through its schemes to integrate the regional states economically and 
politically as subordinate partners, apartheid state co!,stituted the main source of threat to security 
and regional stability. Its regional destabilization and its use of incentive and disincentive levers 
or carrot and stick measures to obtain collaboration characterise this threat. The sponsorship by 
South Africa of political and economic sabotage in the neighbouring states meant that the very 
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survival of these states as viable political economic units was threatened. 
In the final analysis it may be argued that South African engineered cooperative attempts failed 
because of lack of shared interest and incompatibility of values between itself and neighbours. 
The Rand Monetary Zone collapsed while serious disputes over SACU arrangements persisted. 
Commenting on the lack of compatible values, Zacarias (1998: 46) observes that apartheid 
underscored the existence of different values between South Africa and its J*lI1:ners and 
discouraged socio-political and other links necessary for deeper institutionalization of relations. 
In terms of regime theory, South African engineered cooperation failed to result into negotiated 
arrangements in which actors expectations converge. Instead, it remained a unilateral approach 
capable only of producing imposed orders which are inherently unstable. Lack of convergence in 
actors' expectations was largely due to the fact that the perception of what constituted threat was 
not mutual. Yet despite socio-political disharmony between South Africa and its neighbours, 
colonial and historical economic links ensured that a cooperative culture remained but within an 
unstable environment characterised by fear and uncertainty. -
3.1.2 Regional Cooperation in the Perspective of Independent Southern African States 
The evolution of cooperative behaviour among the independent Southern African states has 
mainly addressed the objective of regional political and economic independence (Thompson 
1985). Political liberation from colonial domination of majority African populations in the region 
informs the first instances of cooperation. This was achieved through c?ordination of efforts and 
strategies at the regional level within the framework of the liberation struggle. Despite new 
objectives, the present level of cooperation in the economic, political and other fields has direct 
roots in the political cooperation and struggle against colonialism and oppressive racist white 
minority regimes. Emphasizing this fact, Khama in 1'! ~ekela (1981: viii) notes that the drive for 
economic coordination originated in the experiences of political coordination in the struggle for 
independence. For instance, Thompson (1985:164) observes that the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had 
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established extensive contacts with each other and with Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) while all were in exile. 
It can be argued that this remarkable interaction produced a functional regime in which 
participants' expectations converged around the common interest of political liberation of their 
respective countries. This implied a compatibility of values based on shared historical 
experiences of being dominated. Relative gains in terms of some liberation movements obtaining 
independence for their countries served to strengthen the cooperative regime as stronger bonds 
for cooperation between the newly independent states and remaining liberation movements were 
deepened. On the other hand, the regional states that had come to independence in the early and 
mid sixties (that is, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and the BLS states) provided extensive support to 
the liberation struggle of the remaining parts of the region. Following the independence of 
Angola and Mozambique in 1975, the spirit for collaboration was deepened. This resulted in the 
formation of Frontline States (FLS) group (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia). -
' .. 
The FLS evolved as an ad hoc organizing framework for the collaboration and coordination of 
efforts and strategies aimed at securing the political independence of Rhodesia. At this stage of 
the evolution of cooperative behavior, the participants in the FLS framework had concretized the 
perception of what constituted the major threat to regional security and stability. They saw this 
threat, Thompson (1985: 202) argues, in the form of imperialism represented by domination by 
both South African capital as well as that of its British and American aLlies. It is worthwhile to 
note that the FLS struggle was taking place inthe period (mid to late 1970s and early 1980s) that 
was also characterized by the geopolitics of the Cold War. This was therefore a highly anarchic 
bipolar international environment. This international context inevitably influenced the nature of 
the struggle and cooperation in Southern Africa. The_ presence of extensive British and American 
interests in Rhodesia and South Africa translated into their direct support for South African 
armed aggression against Angola and in the region generally (Thompson 1985: 202). At the same 
time, the American government refused to recognize the new government in Angola because of 
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the perception that it was a Soviet Surrogate. 
The geopolitical dimension of the FLS struggle meant that they had to look East for economic 
assistance and other forms of material aid including arms and even trade. Political collaboration 
within the framework of the FLS began to take a material base. As Thompson (1985: 297) 
observes, the FLS group came to the conclusion that the political independence of Zimbabwe, as 
the second strongest regional economy besides that of South Africa, was tlfe-key to reducing the 
dominance of South African and foreign capital interests over their own economies. This 
development meant that political coordination had began to take the shape of economic 
coordination. Part of this process was made easier by the fact that the goals of FLS were 
consistent with national ideology. For instance, Thompson (1985: 298) observes, the leadership 
in Mozambique (FRELIMO government) explained that Mozambique could not reduce its own 
economic problems without joining the Frontline. As a result of Frontline pressure and 
assistance in various forms, independence for Zimbabwe was finally secured in 1980 and an 
independent Zimbabwe became the sixth member of the Frohtline. In line with the plans for-
regional economic cooperation, the Frontline States together with Malawi, Lesotho and, 
Swaziland formally launched the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) in 1980 at Lusaka, Zambia. This became a direct rejection of the apartheid state's plan 
for a Constellation of Southern African States centered on South Africa. 
The adopted SADCC document outlined four objectives as follows: the reduction of economic 
dependence particularly but not only on the Republic of South Africa; the forging of links to 
create a genuine and equitable regional integration; the mobilization of resources to promote the 
implementation of national, inter-state and regional policies; and concerted action to secure 
international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation (Sefali 
1985: 170). A decentralized structure of sectoral coordination was adopted as the appropriate 
strategy for the achievement of these goals. This meant that SADCC secretariat in Gaborone was 
by design denied institutional capacity to supervise the implementation of projects. Instead, focus 
was placed on the need to achieve regional complementarity in production by coordinating 
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national strategies (Sefali 1985: 174). Both the Frontline States and SADCC can be seen as 
examples of cooperative regimes which manifest behavior from which rules, norms, principles 
and procedures can be inferred. Clear convergence of actors' expectations is manifest in the 
specific issue areas of struggle for political and economic independence. Member states worked 
together despite the fact that different political systems coexisted side by side.5 This 
demonstrated the strong bond of historical experiences and shared economic interests. 
In terms of progressive evolution of cooperative behaviour in the perspective of independent 
Southern African states, the dimension of political coordination of liberation movements was 
complemented by bilateral dealings which were already fairly advanced in the region. Of 
particular note is the Tanzania-Mozambique Permanent Commission of Cooperation. Green and 
Thompson (1986:262) state that cooperation between these two states stands out as the most 
innovative of bilateral cooperation prior to SADCC initiative because it provided the foundation 
on which SADCC was modelled. Other bilaterals included what Khama (in N sekela 1981: xi) 
has described as instances of practical examples of economic coordination in the region in w.hich 
Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique and Swaziland were involved in 
. ~~ 
highway and rail development and rehabilitation projects prior to SADCC. Unlike apartheid 
state's engineered cooperation in the region, the guiding principle of the cooperative efforts of 
the independent Southern African states remained the presence of shared interests and the 
absence of fear or distrust among the actors. This is a necessary prerequisite for long term goals. 
While the SADCC vision projected an economically independent South~rn Africa, it can be 
argued that the vision was informed by a rational as well as pragmatic approach. For instance, 
the SADCC objective of reduction and not elimination of economic dependence on South Africa 
was a clear acknowledgement of the region's historical links and therefore the indivisibility of 
Southern Africa as a region. Therefore while the laun~.hing of the SADCC initiative by the 
srhe uniqueness of the Frontline States and SADCC cooperation is underscored by the fact of the 
heterogeneity of the actors' political values. As Zacarias (1998:46-47) observes, Botswana, a liberal democracy, and 
Malawi, a dictatorship, coexisted with unconstitutional monarchies in Lesotho and Swaziland; Marxist regimes in 
Angola and Mozambique coexisted with single-party states with mixed economies in Tanzania and Zambia. 
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Lusaka Declaration was an important expression of political voluntarism to cooperate, and also 
an important turning point in the struggle to liberate the region politically and economically, the 
end point of this struggle remained far in sight. In this regard the FLS as a functional regime for 
coordination ofliberation strategies continued to<support South West Africa Peoples' 
Organization (SW APO) and African National Congress (ANC) for political and economic 
liberation of Namibia and South Africa respectively. Apartheid South Africa and its allies 
remained the single most important threat to regional stability. Commenting orrthe prerequisite 
for the success of the struggle for economic liberation and regional cooperation in Southern 
Africa, Sefali (1985: 178) noted that the greatest obstacle was the task of dismantling apartheid 
in South Africa and the creation of a democratic post apartheid state. 
Regarding regional interaction within the larger framework of global capitalism, SADCC vision 
for regional economic independence was equally pragmatic. ,§ADCC's objective for concerted 
action to secure international recognition and cooperation within the framework of the strategy 
for economic liberation can be seen as an explicit admission ofcl{Ulnerability to the external 
dimension. This vulnerability translates into dependence of Southern Africa particularly with 
respect to development aid and various other forms of assistance such as trade accoImnodations, 
foreign investments, technology transfer and even debt remission. It therefore appears a 
contradiction for SADCC states to put in place a policy committed to minimization of 
dependence on international capital and simultaneously seek international cooperation and 
financing to realize this objective. In reality there is no contradiction. This strategy is both 
appropriate and necessary for Southern Africa and is again applied alb~it in different regional and 
international contexts in the next evolutionary stage of Southern African cooperation. Short to 
medium term dependence might be a necessary strategy for achieving relative economic 
independence in the long term. 
3.2 The Changed Nature of Security Threat in the Region and Relevance of Current 
Patterns of Cooperation 
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The period early 1990s witnessed radical political changes in Southern Africa. Namibia secured 
political independence through a negotiated settlement in 1990. On the other hand apartheid 
South Africa began political dialogue with the previously banned political parties with the view 
to find a political settlement and to instal a democratic South African state through universal 
suffrage. These regional developments did not take place in isolation of events occuring at the 
international political level. To the contrary, it is possible to argue that radical political changes 
in the region were preceded and even influenced up to a certain degree by radical changes in the 
bipolar international system. In this sense, the fall of communism gave rise to increased pressures 
on undemocratic societies (which included apartheid South Africa) to adopt liberal democratic 
values. Simultaneously, this also meant the end of cold war hostilities and a gradual but certain 
cessation of its associated tensions in Southern Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
The Frontline States and SADCC organizations responded to this new regional and international 
environment by commencing a gradual transformation of regional strategies for cooperation. A 
new framework for cooperation became a vital necessity in-onkr-to address new regional threats 
and opportunities. Accordingly, in August 1992, SADCC was transformed by a treaty!o become 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). Two years later a democratic' post 
apartheid state under a government based on national unity was installed in 1994. In August 
1994 the new South Africa joined SADC membership. Also, apartheid ceased to be the source of 
threat and destabilization in the region thereby ending an era of conflict and confrontation. 
Despite the radical and positive political transformation in Southern Africa, the question of 
neighbouring states' economic dependence on South Africa (a critical issue in the SADCC 
phase) has not been resolved. However, it is possible to argue that the opportunity to ameliorate 
this dependency condition is now available via cooperative means under the SADC framework 
and in the context of a politically stable Southern Africa. It is possible to argue that SADC 
represents a level of cooperative behaviour in Southern Africa whereby relative to previous times 
mutual compatibility of values now exist. Unlike in the SADCC phase, the SADC'phase of 
regional cooperation witnesses a greater convergence of economic, political and social values. 
This is underlined by the fact that all regional states (except the monarchy in Swaziland) embrace 
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liberal democratic values and the related social relations of production. The convergence of 
interests is an important regional asset in terms of resolving historical problems of inequality and 
coping with emergent new threats to regional stability. 
With the end of apartheid, regional cooperation within the SADC framework has to focus on new 
regional threats. Developing the capacity to deal with the new threats is inevitably the first 
challenge. Economic dependence and wide economic asymmetries in the reg-ion stand as serious 
obstacles for developing a regional capacity to cope with the post-apartheid and post-Cold War 
threats. Unlike SADCC, the new framework of cooperation is institutionalized within a binding 
treaty which implies a stronger institutional capacity. While SADCC was nothing more than an 
inter-governmental organization, SADC has the capacity to engage in transnational cooperation 
with external actors. It has supranational institutions that include, inter alia: the Summit of Heads 
of State which make and direct policy; the Council of Ministers, which is tasked to oversee 
policy implementation and the overall functioning and development of SADC; a Secretariat 
responsible for planning, management and implementation 'Of SADC programmes; and a 
Tribunal for settling disputes between members. With explicit rules and procedures, SbDC can 
be seen as a purely formal regime in which participants recognize it as having a continuing 
validity. The plans (within its substructures) toward a fully integrated common market by 2004 
will further increase its supranational competencies and its continued relevance in the present 
global economy. New threats to the region associated with the present global economy will best 
be addressed within a framework of a more integrated region. 
As Muller (1998: 118) states, the current prominence of "low politics" issues has given rise to 
the idea of integrated approach to security and development. For Southern Africa, Muller 
(1998: 118) observes, there are serious threats to security such as: food shortages, mass migration, 
unemployment, insufficient economic growth and s~ forth. It can be argued that poor health-care 
, illiteracy, unequal development and the perennial debt problem compound the threats. In recent 
times export led growth has been hailed as a useful strategy for marginalized countries to 
improve their economies. This new thinking is buttressed by a preference within the donor 
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community, of trade-not-aid foreign policy. Southern African states must therefore focus on trade 
as a strategy for development in order to reduce or manage the new threats to security. To do this 
effectively means devising strategies for coping with the much larger external threat posed by 
economic globalization and liberalization. The ability of Southern African economies to integrate 
effectively with the global economy through trade will also mean the enhancement of their ability 
to manage the new threats to security. In this regard, the role of South Africa as the region's 
economic powerhouse will be indispensable for success just as much as its.cr~ibility and long 
term prosperity is historically linked to that ofthe region. 
As suppliers of primary goods and other basic intermediate manufactures, poor countries are 
concerned about the dangers of de-industrialization in an unregulated world economy. It is 
therefore possible to argue that a global self regulating market constitutes an economic threat to 
poor .countries where governments become limited in their general economic policy. These 
countries, Buzan et al (1998: 98) note, have the fear of exploitation, debt crises, marginalization 
and the resultant unemployment and social polarization. For Sauthern Africa, regional 
regrouping under SADC is an appropriate response to the threat posed by globalizatio~. If 
properly institutionalized in terms of closer adherence to norms and principles, the 'SADC regime 
is capable of guiding the member states towards institutionalization of strong developmental 
democracies in the tradition of social market economy. This suggests that the role of government 
is crucial to invest in people, infrastructure and so forth. This is vital for long term sustainable 
progress where the aim is ultimately to provide the requisite capacity to trade effective1y in the 
global economy. 
This type of political economy is relevant for Southern Africa for two reasons. First, it conforms 
. 
with the liberal values of free enterprise, capitalist market economy. Second, it provides for 
social and political ~tability necessary for emerging. ?emocracies by not allowing unbridled 
market free rein. This view is in conformity with that expressed by the declaration establishing 
SADC treaty (SADC 1992: 3) which emphasizes the urgent imperative ofthe need to achieve 
economic growth and development with equity. A cooperative regime has a clear role to play in 
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this enterprise. HUITel (1995: 346,356) supports this view by arguing that regional groupings can 
provide both a more achievable institutional scale for handling interdependence problems of 
collective management posed by global liberalization and also as a way of preserving particular 
forms of political economy. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The examination of historical cooperation in Southern Africa reveals that despite contradictory 
cooperative objectives of the actors involved, a tradition of cooperation nevertheless became 
embedded in their relations. Colonialism, racism, apartheid and South Africa's regional 
destabilization and its integrationist designs to subordinate the entire subregion politically and 
economically constituted the primary threat to regional security. South Africa's engineered 
attempts at cooperation lacked mutuality of interest and compatibility of values because of its 
hegemonic designs coupled with white supremacist ideology. 
After Zimbabwean independence in 1980 the racist apartheId state's domination of the region 
remained the persistent threat to regional peace and cooperation. The liberation struggle within 
the framework of the Frontline states was instrumental in countering this threat. Through 
political coordination of the liberation movements complemented by bilateral collaboration, an 
enduring cooperative regime within the Frontline emerged. This was sustained by shared interest 
motivated by the need to overcome domination and dependence. This found explicit expression 
in the formation of SADCC inter-governmental framework. Together, the Frontline and SADCC 
initiative constituted an integrative approach to security. Subsequent tFansformation of SADCC 
to SADC in August 1992 reflected the changing regional and international dynamics as much as 
it was a demonstration of confidence and political will to deepen institutionalization of regional 
relations. SADC is therefore a relevant pattern of cooperation in the post-apartheid Southern 
.. 
Africa because it creates the basis for common security in a new spirit of regional cooperation 
within a broadened framework of security. The transformation ofthe apartheid state into a 
democratic state ushered in an era of relative peace in the region. In the absence ofthe apartheid 
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state as the primary source of threat, its legacies now pose a serious threat to security in the 
region. Dependency, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, unequal development, poorly 
performing economies, debt problems and so forth are elements of this threat. However, the 
international dimension of this threat is critical. As such, Southern Africa has to organize its 
\ 
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political economies in ways that address these problems and simultaneously seek ways to 
integrate the region effectively within the global economy. SADC provides the framework within 
which tliis objective is possible. This may call for the presence of strong developmental 
democracies in the tradition of social market economy as an important prerequisite. Equally 
important is the role of the new South Africa as the regional leader. 
As the strongest economy in the region, South Africa is viewed as the gateway for foreign 
investment in the region. This thinking conceives for South Africa a role as a benign hegemon 
operating as a partner within the SADC regime. Accordingly, South Africa is in a position to lead 
a regIonal foreign policy of trade where its relatively superior resources can be brought to bear in 
SADC negotiations with economically powerful external actors. Using the EU as the focal point 
for illumination the next chapter examines this possibility. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SADC Foreign Policy of Trade Towards the European Union: A Revised 
North-South Partnership 
As presently constituted and in terms of regime theory the institution of SADC 
represents an example of a negotiated regional order or regime. It has specific rules and 
decision-making procedures to guide the participants towards their goals and objectives. 
Accordingly, member states have explicitly agreed to eschew independent decision-
making in certain issue areas. Such issue areas range from purely econofnic ones to 
matters of physical security. Our focus here is mainly on economic matters in general and 
trade and related issues in particular. This is what traditionally has been called "low 
politics", whose significance has risen dramatically to the level of "high politics" in 
global relations in the 1990s and beyond. Besides being a regional regime network, 
SADC is also an economic bloc of the Southern African states albeit a weak one relative 
to such economic blocs as the EU or NAFT A. 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a case for crsystematic and structured_ 
cooperation between SADC and the EU within a selective North-South6 framework..> We 
adopt the conception of a regional foreign policy activity approach in which SADC is 
perceived as a framework and strategy for negotiation with the EU. We hypothesize a 
framework that seeks deviation from past North-South dialogues in order to avoid what 
Williams (1994: 47) calls past structural and institutional impediment caused by coalition 
maintenance (that is, maintenance of hard line positions by both parties). New initiatives, 
dialogue methods and 'accommodations will be necessary. Ma~balya (1997: 226) 
argues that such a move necessitates the conception of new global economic strategies 
for SADC states if they are to remain relevant in the current highly competitive global 
economy. Still, weak states are believed to have some degree of political and economic 
'the term "North-South" captures the global question or debate surrounding economic equity and justice in the 
global system whereby the interests of developing countries (The South) are perceived by many observers as 
being marginalised by the prevalent global political and economic arrangements that favour the developed 
industrialised states (The North). This contention is known as the North-South debate and has focussed primarily, 
though not exclusively, on matters of international trade and related issues. Within this understanding, and as used 
in this thesis, a North-South negotiating framework comprises a strategy by a section of the "South" (in this case 
SADC states) for securing meaningful gains or fairer deals by way of selective engagement with certain key actors 
in the global political economy. 
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choice to engage effectively with dominant economic actors. For instance, Rothstein 
(1977; 9) argues that while the available choices for the countries in the South may be 
sharply circumscribed by their weakness and poverty, and the options considered may 
be heavily conditioned by the attitudes and assumptions of the rich Northern states, even 
within these limitations, the possibility of better or worse decisions for each country or 
sub-region has frequently remained open. 
Part one of this chapter outlines the global political economy as the confextWithin which 
SADC-EU cooperation efficiency can be enhanced by a deliberate SADC initiative. The 
relevant unique set of circumstances inherent within it are drawn out, analysed, and their 
impact evaluated on SADC countries as part of the weak, sub-Saharan, Global South7 
states. Part two examines the on-going debate on the future of the Lome Convention 
where its merits, demerits and relevance are assessed. At the same time, the question as 
to whether in the new millennium the Lome Convention provides a blueprint on which 
an SADC-EU partnership can be based is assessed. Part three examines the implications 
for SADC countries of the South Africa-EU trade agreemenrconcluded in March 1999._ 
Finally, SADC as a framework for negotiation with the EU is critically assessed .. > 
We advance the basic argument that it is in the interest of both parties, that is SADC 
and EU, to enhance cooperation efficiency between them. Because of trade 
interdependencies, reciprocal effects between the two groups of countries already exist. 
It is true we can only talk of relative reciprocity as the EU is much more powerlUl 
economically as well -as politically than SADC. Despite this (act, we posit that a 
mutuality of interests as well as reciprocal effects exist because ultimately it is incentives 
that bring cooperating partners together. 
It is argued thatoecause of their marginalised s~tus in the global economy there is more 
urgency on the part ofSADC countries to enter into a structured cooperation arrai:l.gement 
7 A term now often used instead of "Third World" to refer to the World's less economically developed countries. 
The term Global South is therefore used here as an economic concept and will be used interchangeably with other 
terms (such as, the South, developing, less developed, underdeveloped and so forth) which signifY the level of 
economic development attained by a country or a group of countries. The defining condition for the Global South 
is shared underdevelopment. The exact opposite of the term is Global North. 
35 
with the EU. We envisage for the SADC countries, a foreign policy of trade initiative 
towards the EU. The initiative should form the backbone of a long term cooperation 
touching on a myriad of issues such as export market concessions, development 
assistance, technology transfer as well as negotiations on debt cancellations among 
others. An SADC foreign policy of tradeto"wards the EU is in essence development 
diplomacy8 whereby SADC as an economic block is seen as attempting to negotiate 
improvements in its position vis-a-vis the EU and in the global political economy 
generally. Within this approach various strategies for bargaining and engagement can be 
devised and adopted by SADC. 
4.1 The Context: Global Political Economy in the Post-Cold War Era 
The overriding characteristic of the current international political economy or world 
economy is that it has experienced a drastic transformation as a result of accelerated 
growth of transnational economic interests especially in the last two decades. With the 
fall of communism and the subsequent end of the Cold-War,-this process has deepened-
both in form and substance. Underlying this process is the rapid gro.wth of 
interdependence among nations caused mainly by economic globalization9• 
For our purposes we adopt Grant's (1997: 320) definition of economic globalization as 
a process in which transactions across the borders of nation-states increase in importance 
relative to those within nation-states and whereby national boundaries cease to ?~ a 
significant impediment to the movement of goods and services. While dispute still 
persists regarding what economic globalization is or is not, what is beyond dispute, 
observes Schmitter (1997: 313), is the fact that underlying the concept of economic 
8 We adopt Williams (.1994: 46) usage of the term "development diplomacy" to denote the process whereby Third 
World countries attempt to negotiate improvements in their position in the international political economy. This 
process takes the form of bargaining with Western industrialised countries. We argue, however, that old . 
approaches (that is, previous and in some cases existing dialogue platforms) are inefficient and simply untenable in 
the current global political economy and that a revisionist approach is warranted. 
9 In a globalized international economy, distinct national economies are subsumed and re-articulated into the system 
by international processes and transactions. In such a setting the international system becomes autonomized as 
market and production processes are globalized. The national level is permeated by and transformed by the 
international (Ohmae: 1991). This poses a governance problem as national authorities are confronted with the issue 
of how to construct regulatory policies to cope with the systematic interdependence between their economic actors 
(Hirst and Thompson 1997: 339). 
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globalization, the most comprehensive system of exchanges of goods, services, capital 
and labour have been so substantial and so pervasive that even the most isolated national 
or local economy has felt its effects. 
Schmitter (1997: 314) argues that the euphoria and excessive optimism among the 
supporters of economic globalization is that it is coupled with deregulation that compels 
the dismantling of whole parts of national apparatuses for the governance of specific 
issue areas, sectors, professions, localities and so forth as the logic that no;' informs the 
integrated world economy. McGowan (1991: 1) correctly points out that the futures of 
peoples as well as regions, such as Southern African region, are increasingly determined 
by the workings of the world economy. 
The method through which SADC countries can improve their participation in the world 
economy is to develop regional strategies for bargaining and negotiating with key actors 
in the world economy. In this regard, focus should be on those actors with whom there 
exists important trade, investment and political links -as \VeIl as those possessing a' 
substantial influence on the workings of the global political economy. The EUis"one 
such major actor in the world today and with whom SADC states share important trade, 
investment and political ties. According to Kegley and Wittkopf(1997: 165), a combined 
gross national product of more than six trillion dollars makes the EU the largest and 
richest single consumer market in the world. The US is the other key actor in the current 
global political economy. This is underlined by its continued hegemonic influence in the 
multilateral dimension (Mitchell: 1996a) of global politico-economic affairs. That is, the 
US influence in multinational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) , the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) continues to be 
substantial, giving it a huge clout to influence policy directions especially in developing 
states. 
The global economy in the post-Cold War era is inevitably influenced by the policies of 
such key actors as the EU and US. Since the end of the Cold War signifies the 
ideological victory of capitalism over communism, the concern for the sub-Saharan 
countries, of which SADC countries are a part, should be about how the West will use 
37 
this victory in its relations with Africa. So far, initial developments in this regard have 
not been favourable for the sub-Saharan countries in general. As Parfitt (1996: 56) has 
noted, the liberation of the Warsaw Pact states from Soviet domination following the fall 
of communism has meant the emergence of a rival area for aid funding. 
According to Matambalya (1997: 230) such a development is exacerbated by economic 
globalization in which the preservation of the welfare status among the West European 
economic powers will be derived less from the primordial links such as-that of the EU-
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific), and more from their strategic positioning in the 
new global political economy. Accordingly, Matambalya(1997: 230) further notes, EU's 
interest will be focussed more to Eastern Europe and South East Asia as immediate 
sources of economic interest. 
Regarding the West's economic interest in Eastern Europe, Agonafer (1996: 21) outlines 
four critical factors currently shaping EU's external policy as follows: the markets in 
Eastern Europe and the developmental potet).tial of their ecoilOmies are more attractive-
than markets in Africa; East Europeans are geographically close to the production centres 
in the West and their infrastructures are comparatively well developed; relative to Africa, 
there are plenty of skilled and educated people in Eastern Europe. Finally, the European 
bonds of common history, culture, race and sometimes even language make Eastern 
Europe a natural location for Western economic investment and expansion. This new EU 
orientation translates into a clear shift of the development assistance focus in favour of 
Eastern Europe and therefore marginalization of African countries. 
In contrast to Eastern European countries, the sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s are 
bedevilled by a host of seemingly intractable economic problems or crises. Lumumba-
Kasongo (1994:-"5) observes that the late 1980s negative growth syndrome has persisted 
with minimal economic growth in the early 1990s of between one and three point one 
percent. It is such poor economic performance, notes Chern (1996: 49), that made Africa 
account for less than one percent of world trade in the early 1990s. The problem is 
compounded, argues Chern (1996: 49), by major advances in biotechnology in the West 
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which has effectively reduced the significance of traditional sub-Saharan exports as a 
result of substitution. 
But of all the problems confronting the sub-Saharan region in the 1990s, the external debt 
crisis remains the prime reason for the persistence of the socio-economic crisis. This 
means that for the maj ority of SADC countries, prosperity will remain a pipe-dream until 
the debt problem is efficiently tackled. While the debt morass the sub-Saharan countries 
find themselves embedded in is quite crippling economically and espeCially from a 
development perspective, there appears to be no urgency on the part of the rich creditor 
nations to address this problem. Instead, Mitchell (l996a: 69) notes, they continue to 
press for further liberalization as part of the neo-liberal free market strategies which 
underlie the ideological theme of the "new world order"lO. Black and Swatuk (1997: 50) 
have stated that this new order is also characterised by donor fatigue and the global 
decline in real spending on development assistance. 
The relations of the poor sub-Saharan African countries with the creditor nations and 
international financial institutions in the new world order have substantially.been 
altered. Trade and not aid is the accompanying theme of the 1990s and beyonX and as 
Mitchell (1996a: 70) observes, is part of the American vision for political and economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. It is in this context that US is developing new 
instruments for engagement with Africa. Key among them are, the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act and Partnership for Economic Growth in Africa Program. These two 
policy instruments can'be said to be mutually reinforcing. Castiel (1997: 1100) observes 
that both emphasize the fact that only those African states carrying out serious economic 
and political reforms can reap full benefits. Castiel (1997: 1100) has noted that the 
essential provisions embraced by these instruments are a comprehensive package of trade, 
investment ana development measures that in~~ude the establishment of a US-Africa 
10 The "new world order" as a concept can be said to reflect the post - Cold War paradigm shift in security 
conception towards greater focus on economic issues. The prime mover of this concept and process is the United 
States. Some observers such as Mitchell (1996a: 69) have referred to this US influence as the "grand strategy" of 
American foreign policy informed by a vision of enlargement and consolidation of the global community of 
democratic capitalist societies. 
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free trade zone, a US-Africa economic Forum, and two investment funds worth US 
dollars 650 million. 
Access to any of these benefits is conditioned to political and economic reforms. 
Therefore the actualization of these benefits' oy the targeted recipients will be in a long 
while to come given the current debate on the validity and viability of conditionality I I 
and related policy demands. This is coupled with what some (Williams 1994) see as the 
obvious attempt by the United States and its capitalist allies to impose universal standards 
through the process of globalization. Some commentators in this debate such as 
Matambalya (1997: 238) see no harm in the introduction by donor countries of some form 
of conditionality based on plausible criteria. However, what may constitute plausible 
criteria is itself a contested terrain. Mitchell (1996a: 80), for instance argues that the pace 
of the inculcation in the sub-Saharan Africa of Western models for political and 
economic development should take cognizance of the specific circumstances of the 
society in question. 
With a focus on Southern Africa, Shaw (1996: 86) believes that IMP/World Bank 
conditionality and reform policies have served to divide SADC States and exacerbate 
inequalities most noticeably between the non-reformers (Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland), 
late reformers (Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe), strong reformers (Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania) and the ex-reformer (Zambia). It can therefore be argued that the net result has 
been increased dependence on aid and external assistance in general and invariably more 
loans. Shaw (1996: 86) takes the view that the problem of dependence cannot be solved 
by the more intense application of conventional development strategies ( those 
prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank) that created the problem in the first place. 
-
lIThe policy demands made by the IMF comprise what is commonly referred to as "conditionality", whose 
provisions (Mitchell 1996a: 75) are ostensibly designed so as to enable the borrower to achieve balance of 
payment equilibrium in the short-term and self-sustained growth in the long-term. The World Bank also employs 
conditionality in its policy-based lending termed Structural Adjustment Programs(SAPs). Mitchell (1996b: 35) 
contends that overall result of SAPs in the Global South has been failure and economic viability still an elusive 
goal. In the 1990s, multilateral as well as bilateral sources of aid have extended conditionality to include policy 
demands in the political domain. Some commentators (Matambalya 1997: 195) cite humanitarian justification in 
the use of aid as an instrument for achieving higher goals of good governance and democratic consolidation. 
Others (Williams 1994: 23) have argued that the practice of the use of resource flows by multilateral and bilateral 
donors to exercise leverage over domestic economic policy in the Global South amounts to continued infringement 
of economic sovereignty. 
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In the case of Southern Africa Shaw (1996: 85) has referred to these external economic 
interventions by the creditor nations, the IMF and the Wodd Bank as contemporary 
forms of destabilisation with adverse socio-economic consequences. 
Most commentators on the debate are a~are and acknowledge the imperative of 
structural change and economic reform in particular for the majority ofthe sub-Saharan 
countries. This awareness has increased the need for new policy initiatives and 
especially home-grown initiatives. The critical component of this awareness should be 
an appreciation as Lumumba-Kasongo (1994) has explained, that externally imposed 
and directed policies and programs cannot be a substitute for a country's own policies 
to achieve structural transformation. Underlying the need for new initiatives is the high 
cost of debt and what Shaw (1996: 86) has termed the obsolescence of colonial 
commodity economies in the global political economy of the 1990s. 
In terms of new policy orientation for the marginalised sub-Saharan African countries, 
some commentators have more specific policy prescriptions or directions. Arguing from' 
the pragmatic and realistic premise that for better or for worse Africa will remain in and 
-" '" ... 
continue to function as part ofthe world system, Lumumba-Kasongo (1994) addresses 
the question of the terms of relations for African states in the global political economy 
and favours internally generated policy orientations. Lumumba-kasongo (1994:1) 
contends that significant and appropriate political and policy changes which may have 
positive impact on Africa's relations with other countries will have to be internally 
generated. This orientation, argues Lumumba-Kasongo (1994: 8);requires a conscious 
political rethinking or re-invention on the part of the marginalised African countries. 
Lumumba-Kasongo (1994: 10) argues that as part of a political and intellectual effort 
the re-invention needed will require the break-up of the old ideological barriers (the 
colonial and neo-colonial ones) and the building of new ones as a prerequisite for 
regional as well as continental renewal. Lumumba-Kasongo's view can be said to be in 
line with the currently expressed view in the West that Mrica should solve its own 
problems. For this to be a viable project Lumumba-Kasongo (1994: 34) argues that 
new political alliances based on common political interests and objectives at the regional 
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and continental level will be necessary. Lumumba-Kasongo (1994: 20) further argues 
that more importantly, African countries should see development as not only being an 
adaptive process, but also as a reflective and creative force and a product of systematic 
imagination. Implicit in Lumumba-Kasongo' s overall view is the fact that the role of the 
state as an agent for directing change and p~oviding an enabling regulatory framework 
is crucial. 
This argument contradicts the one advocated by the creditor nations -a; the. staunch 
supporters ofthe globalization processes and economic liberalization. But the irony is 
that the globalization process itself is a politically facilitated as well as enforced project. 
Grant (1997: 322) puts this into perspective as he points out that economic liberalization 
is a politically mediated change aimed at facilitating globalization by reducing restrictions 
on foreign investment, trade and capital movements to ensure a regulatory climate for 
economic operations on a global scale. But such a regulatory climate is precisely what 
is unsuitable for most sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s especially because of the rising 
external debt and failed Structural Adjustment Prograrlls (SAPs). 
Onimode (1996: 111) has stated that the heavy external debt burden and the failed SAPs 
define the essence of the ongoing re-colonization of Africa under the aegis of the IMF 
and the World Bank. Along this line of argument Mitchell (1996b: 37) states that a nation 
may be regarded as being conditionality dependent if it continues to implement 
conditionality provisions even when they have proven to be detrimental to development 
efforts. If we accept that this state of affairs is increasingly becoming a pervasive 
characteristic of sub-Saharan countries' relations with the creditor nations and the 
multilateral agencies under their control, then we also accept that a process of re-
colonization is underway. In other words, Mitchell (1996b: 37) further argues, the loss 
--
of policy-making prerogative places the debtor nations in a state that in fundamental ways 
resembles their colonial past. 
Yet shifts in the global political economy in the 1990s continue to place significant 
constraints on the Third World countries in general and the poorest countries in the sub-
Saharan Africa in particular. A notable development in the 1990s has been the 
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conclusion ofthe Uruguay Round of multi lateral trade negotiations and the establishment 
ofthe World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1993. In effect this now means that through 
the institutional machinery of WTO the cause of global free trade has gained new 
impetus. 
For the poor SADC countries there are more costs or constraints than benefits associated 
with this development. As part of the poor sub-Saharan countries, what SADC states 
perceive as beneficial trade arrangements may now face the prospect of being rolled 
back under pressure from the developed states favouring economic liberalisation. A key 
development in this regard is the changed behaviour of the EU towards its trading 
partners in the South. Koning (1997: 16) notes that partly in response to international 
pressure, the EU has sought to create reciprocal agreements with countries and regions 
in the South in the form mainly of free trade areas. The recently concluded SA-EU Free 
Trade Agreement symbolizes this trend. The EU's trade cooperation with the sub-
Saharan Africa has been conducted on the basis of the latter's preferential access to the 
EU market through the Lome Convention. The Lome Convention is a non- reciprocal,-
trade and other economic concessions extended by the EU to the African, Caribbeall and 
Pacific (ACP) group of developing countries since 1975. These non-reciprocal 
accommodations to the ACP group have been criticised by the United States which cite 
them as serious obstacles to the promotion of global free trade as they are seen to be 
incompatible with provisions of the WTO. 
As Goodison (1997: 60) observes, the movement away from more traditional 
development cooperation (such as the EU-ACP arrangement) is most implicitly related 
to the imperatives of the WTO and the new global trading system. In this regard it is 
worthwhile to ~ote, Mitchell (1996a: 71) points out, the avowed intent of the Clinton 
Administration to raise a multilateral consensus'in support of its policies and ts> utilize 
constituent institutions (namely WTO, IMF, World Bank and so forth) in their 
implementation. In the 1990s post -Cold War era, Mitchell (1996a: 71) contends that the 
US has positioned itself as the custodian for the maintenance of global equilibrium. He 
further argues (1996a: 70) that for the Clinton Administration the objective is also one 
of supporting the effort by societies making the transition to democracy and capitalism 
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from more closed political and economic systems. On this issue it appears that there is 
a clear and open policy by the dominant global economic players in the 1990s to 
influence policy outcomes on a global scale to suit their preferences. For instance, 
Goodison (1997: 59) observes that theEU trade policy is actually very global and that the 
~ < 
EU is as committed to multilateralism as any other world player. The debate on the future 
of the Lome Convention has not been immune to these kind of views. 
4.2 Debate on the Future of Lome Convention Beyond 2000 : Implications for 
SADC States 
Lome Convention was instituted in 1975 in Lome, Togo. The signatories of the 
convention are the EU and the ACP group of countries. All sub-Saharan African 
countries except South Africa are members of the Lome Convention. Since 1975 the 
Lome Convention has been renegotiated three times, that is, 1980, 1985 and 1989. The 
current Lome IV, which covers ten years is due to expir~ in!~ebruary 2000. The Lome 
Convention can be said to be an aid program or package for ACP group of countries from 
the European Community, now European Union. The substance of the program has 
included over the years the following main concessions: a non-reciprocal trade 
preference; an economic assistance program; an industrial and technical cooperation 
program; two insurance schemes for commodities and other protocols on sugar, bananas, 
rum, veal, and so forth. The main rationale for this trade promotion and financial 
assistance program has heen to facilitate the development of the ACP group of countries. 
The debate on-the future of Lome Convention beyond 2000 and the implications for 
SADC countries as Southern Africa ACP members is informed by several view points. 
Many 0 bservers s~e A CP -EU cooperation as a successful model for North-South relations 
in general (Babarinde 1999; Matambalya 1997j.' In addressing this issue, Schmuck 
(1990: 45) observes that while some commentators have glorified the Lome Convention 
as an important marker on the road to a new international economic order (Matambalya 
1997), others (Koning 1997: 18) have described it as a tool of Western imperialism and 
neo-colonialism that perpetuates dependence on the EU and therefore in need of 
modification. 
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In analysing the debate on the future of the Lome Convention, its merits are set against 
its demerits. In this regard two considerations are critical. The first is the question of 
Lome's success or failure in bringing about a measure of development of the ACP group 
of countries in the last two and a half decades it has been in operation. The second is the 
question of the relevance of a regime such as Lome in the radically changed global 
political economy as well as the profound changes within the EU itself. In terms of 
current thinking, the nature of the Lome trade and financial cooperation regime is the type 
~ - -
considered traditional trade and development cooperation which is characterized by non-
reciprocal nature of concessions. This is in contrast to a framework of cooperation such 
as the kind referred to by Goodison (1997: 38) as "the new innovative comprehensive 
economic cooperation approach". This is the type of cooperation the EU now prefers as 
it includes, Koning (1997: 18) observes, non-traditional instruments and is increasingly 
based on mutual interest and a business-like approach to development. Such an 
arrangement essentially fits the framework of a free trade cooperation agreement. 
On the question of success ofthe Lome Convention, some observers (Matambalya 1997;-
Schmuck 1990) present a scenario depicting the ACP countries in the absenc<~ofthe 
Lome arrangements and accordingly argue that their economic situation would have 
worsened. Implicitly, the Lome arrangements have significantly improved their economic 
prospects. These same observers point to the systematic proliferation of Lome 
Convention membership as being perhaps the most obvious evidence of its m~Jjts. 
Schmuck (1990: 52) observes that the partners to the Lome Convention have rated the 
institutional provisions ofthe Lome cooperation as being positive and that the meetings 
are regularly characterized as constructive and open-minded. 
Specifically, M,:tambalya (1997: 187) heralds as an obvious and important merit, the 
comprehensiveness of the Lome Convention to include such diverse areas as trade 
development, protection of the environment, enterprise development and so forth. With 
a specific focus on Southern Africa region, Matambalya (1997: 188) intimates that the 
European Development Fund (EDF), a component of Lome arrangements, constituted a 
significant and probably the most reliable source of resource transfers to Southern Africa 
in the absence of a conducive environment in the region for stimulating resource inflows 
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via the conventional sources such as venture capital and foreign investment. Matambalya 
(1997: 189) emphasizes the significance of the Lome Convention as the only platform of 
the North-South dialogue which brings together the North and the South as equal partners 
despite the clear economic and political asymmetries between them . 
• ~ -F 
Besides the inherent benefits to the ACP states (Matambalya 1997) as a result of the 
institutionalization of economic concessions under the various Lome negotiations (that is 
~- -
Lome I to IV), Matarnbalya (1997: 195) also argues that the Lome Conventions have been 
instrumental in the aspect of institutionalizing political relations between the partners. As 
evidence, he (1997: 195) cites the ACP-EU contacts via the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers, the ACP-EU committee of Ambassadors and the joint ACP-EU Assembly ( 
where the EU is represented by members of the European Parliament). 
For instance, it has been considered (Schmuck 1990: 52) as Lome success, the extensive 
discussion by the joint ACP-EU Assembly of the issue of economic sanctions against the 
-- --~ 
Republic of South Africa in the Lome III negotiations. This happened despite the fact thaf 
for a long time (Schmuck 1990: 520) the European Community (EC) ministers refus'ed to 
discuss the question at all because this "political problem" was not covered explicitly by 
the Lome Convention. 
Institutionalization of economic and political relations is clearly an important merit Qfthe 
Lome convention. The trend by the ACP countries to follow an institutional strategy was 
developed from Lome inception in 1975 and has continued through the various Lome 
negotiations. This trend, according to Schmuck (1990: 52), gradually introduced new 
questions (issue area expansion) such as the fight against apartheid, cultural cooperation 
and the debt prq.blem into the parliamentary forum to obtain a common position, after 
which the ACP side would put the issue on the agenda of the ACP-EC CO?llcil of 
Ministers, which is the ultimate decision maker on questions of cooperation. 
Addressing the issue of institutionalization from the perspective of North-South relations, 
Sandberg and Shambaugh (1993: 160) argue that the achievement of the South's long-
term economic and political goals requires the institutionalization of ongoing negotiations 
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with Northern states. They contend (1993: 160) that this is necessary as it creates a 
permanent platform for dialogue and therefore helps to monitor and safeguard negotiated 
gains. In this regard it can be argued that the Lome Conventions have made important in-
roads. 
It would appear that both parties favour the continuation of cooperation. However, 
Koning (1997: 23) points to the shifting priorities of the EU and the aig Ja1igue among 
European nations as indicative of a desired change of the Lome arrangements. Babarinde 
(1999: 231) notes that the enlarged EU now has new European members who are not as 
sympathetic to ACP countries and would gladly welcome the severance of the EU-ACP 
links. However, Matambalya (1997: 231) notes that the current thinking in the EU circles 
would favour the retention ofthe EU-ACP links but in a substantially altered form. This 
analysis of the Lome debate thus far has focussed on the merits of the Lome arrangements. 
The assessment of the demerits will paint a clearer picture. 
Schmuck (1990: 47) observes that by 1990 (fifteen years since Lome inception) majority 
of the ACP countries still belonged to the group ofthe least developed countries in which 
even basic human needs such as food, housing and medical care are not guaranteed. It 
would appear then that the development of trade between the EC and ACP remains 
unsatisfactory. Two and a half decades later, Babarinde (1999: 230) notes, the 
circumstances remain very much the same with observers criticizing the Lome Convention 
for failing to advance the deVelopment of the ACP countries as a group. 
At present, according to Babarinde (1999: 231), the lack ofleadership, the poor economic 
performance within the ACP group, and the profoundly altered global political economy, 
" 
the A CP group has lost any leverage it might have possessed and now find itself in a take-
it-or-leave-it dependent relationship with the EU. Ravenhill (1993: 45) observes that by 
far the most important negotiations took place not between the EC and the ACP but 
between the EC Commission and the European member states. This revelation obviously 
has a serious implication. It suggests that the outcomes which ultimately bind the ACP 
countries are largely of a unilateral nature. The Lome Convention's principles of equality 
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of partnership and joint decision-making are therefore only a legalistic formality (Schmuck 
1990: 51). Ravenhill (1993: 59) contends that the effectiveness of ACP as a group has 
always been hampered by the weakness ofthe ACP Secretariat. 
Besides the lack oftechnical skills, Schmuck (1990: 49) believes that the effectiveness of 
the ACP as a group was further hampered by the group's heterogeneity which created 
problems in articulating and implementing far-reaching common goals.r m this regard, 
Schmuck (1990: 49) cites as an example the fact that in the Lome IV negotiations it was 
extremely difficult for the ACP delegation to articulate clear-cut priorities in the trade 
sector because of the obvious rivalry between them and their specific aims and problems. 
He further (1990: 49) notes that neither the mechanisms nor group solidarity have been 
strong enough to formulate clear group positions with this problem extending to serious 
disagreements over the appointment of the Secretary-General. 
With such problems of cohesion it is no wonder that a numoeroIobservers have criticized ' 
the ACP Secretariat for its inefficiency and overall unsatisfactory functioning. In the view 
of Babarinde (1999: 231) the negotiation processes of the Convention became ritualised 
and outcomes fairly predictable. This becomes a credible view given the unilateral nature 
of the negotiation process. Babarinde goes on to suggest (1999: 232) that many analysts 
believe that the EU has maintained its relationship with the ACP countries because oftheir 
collective weakness. The other dimension of this weakness is the lack of technical skills 
on the part of ACP countries. It has been argued (Matambalya 1997; 200) that the Lome 
Convention is characterised by such complex arrangements with diverse cooperation areas 
and a multitude of instruments (including complex rules of origin) to the extent that some 
ACP participants have experienced difficulty understanding the provisions. However, it 
is also argued (Graumans 1997: 16) that part, of this problem is due to lack of 
implementing capacity of the EC Commission. It is possible to argue that Lome; spoor 
impact was partly a result of lack of shared responsibility on the part of the parties 
concerned. 
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Another critical aspect of Lome's poor impact on ACP, Graumans (1997: 16) has noted, 
is to do with the financial cooperation component whereby sixty to eighty percent ofthe 
resources are channelled back to Europe. Matambalya lists four more Lome drawbacks. 
First, he notes (1997: 202) that vested interesJ:s~ in the EU have continued to ensure that 
returns on aid results in aid being tied to securing of contracts to EU governments and 
firms as well as creation of employment for EU nationals. As a consequence of this, the 
net aid available to the recipient ACP economies is substantially reduced ~ expatriate 
salaries, consultancy fees and so forth. This observation would suggest that the non-
reciprocal benefits for the ACP countries under the EU-ACP partnership are seriously 
eroded. It also suggests that the benefits of this relationship have been articulated on the 
basis of inaccurate assessment of the direction of resource flows. It can also be argued 
that the Lome arrangements have in fact been more beneficial to the EU states than ACP 
states. 
The second drawback and one that has a Southern African focus is explained (Matambalya ' 
1997: 203) as the excessive focus of Lome Convention activities on the use of e?Ctefnal 
income base (mainly in terms of aid) to combat economic underdevelopment in Southern 
African subregion, instead of augmenting the internal income base by supporting and 
transforming internal production. As a result, the promotion of self-sustaining and 
competitive economies failed. Thirdly, Matambalya (1997: 204) notes how _tlIe 
improvement of the political environment in most ACP states was compromised for 
geopolitical considerations to the extent that the Lome Convention did not hinder the rise 
and consolidation in many ACP states of de facto "one party" and "military regime" 
cultures. To the extent that Western external policies towards the Third World have 
linked economic growth and development to good governance (Mitchell 1996a), it can be 
'" 
argued that geopolitics presented both a contradiction and a serious obstacle to 
development efforts in ACP countries. Finally, Matambalya (1997: 204) contends that the 
debt problem of SADC states has persisted and deteriorated despite their membership to 
Lome Convention. 
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Table 4.1 Developing Countries' Share ofEU Imports, 1976 -1994 (%) 
1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
~ . 
ACP 6.7 7.2 6.7 4.7 3.7 2.8 
Asia 4.2 5.9 6.5 11.0 13.6 13.1 
Latin America 5.3 5.1 6.5 4.6 5.1 ~. ~ 5.4 
Mediterranean 6.1 6.1 8.1 6.5 6.2 6.1 
All developing 
Countries 44.8 42.4 34.7 31.2 29.2 34.2 
Source: cited in Koning, A. 1997. "The EU' s Trade and Development Policy: Past, Present 
and Future" in Houghton, R. (ed.) Trading on Development: South Africa's Relations with 
the European Union. Bramfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, pp.12-26. 
With all these drawbacks, it can be argued that the Lome Convention has met,with 
. ~~ 
minimal success as measured against its objectives of improving the sustainable 
development of Southern Africa ACP associates through improved trading opportunities 
and other measures. The statistics on table 4.1 above depict the deterioration of EU 
imports from ACP countries as compared to other developing countries. Accordi~~ to 
these statistics, in 1976 the ACP imports to the EU market accounted for 6.7 percent 
share of the total EU imports. In 1994 this share plummeted to a dismal 2.8 percent 
representing a loss of over half the ACP share of the EU market. This is a clear 
quantitative manifestation of the drawbacks inherent in the Lome arrangements and hence 
the ineffectiveness of the whole enterprise. Asia's share of the EU market tripled over the 
same period, while exports from Latin America and the Mediterranean region remained 
at least fairly constant. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish a reasonable balance between internal and 
external factors contributing to the poor trade and development performance of Southern 
Africa ACP states in the effort to understand their marginalization in the world economy. 
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In this regard Rothstein (1977: 10) notes that the Third World countries and the very poor 
ones in particular, such as the sub-Saharan countries, have devoted minimal resources in 
improving the domestic policy-making framework. He (1977: 11) further argues that 
efforts to remove hindrances like trade barriers and associated problems cannot overcome 
~< 
problems created by corrupt and conservative ruling elites because they compromise aid 
utilisation efficiency. 
It is expected that after expiry of the current Lome arrangements in February 2000, the 
shape and form of the SADC-EU cooperation will address the issue of the internal policy 
field in SADC states and ACP states in general. This expectation is informed by the 
formally established objectives ofEU development cooperation policy as stipulated in the 
Maastricht Treaty of 199212• Graumans (1997: 12) cites the relevant objectives contained 
in.article 130u of the treaty as follows: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law; the promotion and consolidation of democracy; the smooth and 
gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy. Implied in these· 
objectives is the clear message that development assistance and related cooperation 
partnership will increasingly embody a measure of conditionality. 
As the debate on the future of Lome continues, it has become evident that deficits in the 
internal policy make-up of ACP countries are noted as a significant contribution to-the 
poor impact of Lome .. Matambalya (1997: 235) notes especially that past Lome 
Convention measures focussed mainly on cooperation with the public sector and that 
therefore the Lome Convention in its current form is no longer the appropriate device to 
guide cooperation between the EU and the SADC states. This view obviously accepts the 
increasing involv~ment and growing role of the private sector in the economic reforms 
-' < 
taking place in many countries of the world presently. In this regard Matambalya 
12 Maastricht is a city in Netherlands where the European Union Treaty was signed in 1992. The treaty entered 
into force in November 1993 and created the EU as the umbrella term for the European Community's diverse 
institutions. The treaty also provided, among other things, a timetable for completing a single-market Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) and aimed to create a single currency in 1999 to serve as the most potent symbol of 
Europe's new dynamism (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997: 510). /.!-:~.."..., .... 
l~l\f:t~"} \ 
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(1997 :23 5) notes that in the long-run, SADC links with the EU must be in conformity with 
the resolutions of the WTO. 
Despite radical opinions and viewpoints regai-ding the relevance and future of the Lome 
Convention after February 2000, the development cooperation policy contained in the 
Maastricht Treaty suggests that the links between the EU and its ACP partners will 
~ - -
continue. Equally obvious now is the fact that the new links will be substantially altered 
in the effort to adopt new forms of cooperation that are compatible with the general 
resolutions of the WTO. The fact that Maastricht Treaty contains specific policy 
guidelines on the modality ofEU interaction with the Global South states (with emphasis 
on human rights, rule oflaw, promotion and consolidation of democracy and so forth) is 
sufficient evidence of the importance the EU attaches to its role as a key player in the 
North-South economic cooperation. 
The bottom line of the debate on Lome's future suggests that on the whole the benefi!s of 
the Lome arrangement have been marginal for SADC region. The debate also sUggests 
that much now needs to be done by the SADC countries themselves to improve their own 
development prospects. This poses new challenges for SADC states especially with 
regard to development of new terms of engagement with the EU as an important 
economic partner. Of particular note, the Lome debate has produced a consensus on the 
imperatives of structural change and economic reform required of the majority ofthe sub-
Saharan states. Further, it is expected that a large component ofthe needed transformative 
policies be increasingly internally generated and directed. Inevitably this will mean placing 
on the SADC states a heavy demand for informed policy input as well as accountable and 
efficient management of the development effort and of available resources. 
It is also reasonable to conclude that given the overwhelming deficits or demerits of the 
Lome Convention at the dawn of the new millennium, it does not as a framework for 
cooperation provide a blueprint on which an SADC-EU partnership for the next 
millennium can be constructed. It may, however, be said to constitute a useful starting 
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point by way of providing inspiration and as a guide for the way forward at this important 
juncture. 
In terms of inspiration to guide the way forward into the future, it will be necessary for 
SADC states to take into consideration the pt;rtJ.nent issues in the debate on Lome's future 
as they react to the recently concluded (March1999) SA-EU trade pact. The implications 
of this agreement for the subregion should be carefully evaluated especially in terms of the 
precedent it seems to have set for long-term SADC-EU cooperation. Equally important, 
the outcome of the SA-EU trade agreement should considerably inform the SADC 
position in respect of the type and form of its cooperation not only with the EU, but also 
with other powerful external economic actors such as the United States in the post-Lome 
regime and into the next millennium. 
4.3 SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA): 
Implications for SADC States 
On March 24, 1999 the bilateral agreement between South Africa and the EU was finally 
concluded at the Berlin Summit for EU Heads of State. It has been termed the Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and is quite a unique agreement as it 
has combined free trade, development cooperation and political dialogue. The date of 
effectiveness of the TDCA is January 2000. Another unique aspect of the agreement is 
the fact that for the first time the ED has concluded a free trade I3 deal that provides for the 
general elimination of trade restrictions in the area of agriculture. 
Because of the inherent implications on SADC states of the free trade component of the 
--
TDCA, it is necessary to investigate closely the exact nature of this component. Five key 
principles, namely: asymmetry and differentiation; protection for sensitive sectors; support 
for regional integration; WTO compatibility; integration of South Africa into the global 
13 Free Trade is meant to denote a condition in which exchange of goods and services between countries is free 
from tariffs or other non-tariff barriers. Orthodox economic theory contends that free trade will maximise global 
welfare but in a world of self-interested states this ideal has never fully operated (Nel and McGowan 1999: 318). 
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economy; have been identified as the pillars around which the nature of the free trade 
component revolves (European Union News 1999: 4). It is worthwhile to note that the 
developmental aspect of the signed SA -EU pact was, as Keet (1997: 125) has noted, South 
Africa's proactive strategy to change the paraqigmatic framework of what initially was in 
essence bilateral free trade negotiations. Further, Keet (1997: 124) observes, South Africa 
took the position that its strategic political, security, trade and development relations with 
its fellow members of Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and -SADC are of 
fundamental significance in its approach to negotiations with the EU. This stance by South 
Africa demonstrates its commitment to the region and clearly identifies itself as part of 
Southern Africa. 
The substance of the TDCA and especially the developmental approach of the trade 
provisions is explained within the twin concept of asymmetry and differentiation. In this 
regard, the focus was on the quantity and period of liberalization in percentage and 
temporal terms respectively. Accordingly, Block (1999: 6) has noted, under the accord, -
the ED will liberalize ninety-five percent of its South African imports within te~years 
while South Africa is to remove barriers to eighty-six percent of its EU imports over a 
period of twelve years. The transitional periods are to commence upon entry into force 
of the agreement, that is January 2000. This asymmetry and differentiation is intended to 
reflect the different development levels of South Africa and the EU as well as the fact !~at 
South Africa is undergoing a difficult period restructuring the apartheid economy. Also, 
to underscore this fact, within these periods the bulk ofliberalization of industrial products 
of the ED side will take place in the first four years, while on the corresponding South 
Africa side tariff reduction for most industrial products will only start after six years 
(European Union News 1999: 4). As part of the TDCA the EU offered South Africa 
-" 
qualified membership14 of the Lome Convention in April 1997. 
14 Qualified membership essentially means that South Africa cannot participate fully in the benefits of Lome and is 
therefore excluded from the general trade regime and special trade protocols of the Convention. Qualified 
membership was, among other things, intended to assist South Africa redress its historically isolated position, both 
at the intemationallevel and in respect of its neighbours in SADC region. It also allows South Africa to tender for 
European Development Fund Projects under the Lome Convention and to participate fully in the institutions of the 
Convention which provide for a permanent dialogue. Presently, South Africa is participating as a full partner in 
the on-going negotiations to establish a new framework for cooperation after expiry of Lome in February 2000. 
This is a positive development for SADC states as they are able to benefit from South Africa's relatively superior 
and extensive research resources and skilled negotiating capacity. 
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The immediate implication of the SA-EU agreement is that it places South Africa in a 
better position than the rest of SADC states in terms of closeness and overall relationship 
with the European Union. This is the case especially with regard to access to the EU 
market. An associated sectoral agreement with the EU namely, Science and Technology 
Agreement (signed December 1996) reinforces SA-EU technological links and places 
South Africa in quite a favourable position with the EU. 
Table 4.2 Access of Third Countries to the EU Market (Most Preferred Partners) 
European Union 
Level 6 European Economic Area ( Possible historical position of ACP ) 
Level 5 Central and Eastern European Countries 
-
-
Level 4 Free trade areas: Israel, Turkey ... ( SA's position after TDCA) 
.' 
Level 3 Mediterranean countries ',' 
Level 2 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) 
Level 1 Generalised System of Preferences 15 ( SA's position before 
TDCA) 
. """ -
Bottom Oth~r Countries: MFN treatmentl6 
Source: Adapted from Komng, A. 1997. "The EU's Trade and Development Polley: Past, Present and 
Future" in Houghton, R. (ed.) Trading on Development: South Africa's Relations with the European Union. 
Bramfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue, pp.12-26. 
In terms of table 4.2 which depicts access of third countries to the EU market, Koning 
-" 
(1997: 16) contends that it is likely that the AGPstates at one time stood as the most 
15This is an arrangement permitted by GATT (now WTO) in which certain goods from the Global South are 
granted privileged access to markets in the North. The scheme provides compatibility with the non-discrimination 
principle of GATT. 
16 MFN (Most Favoured Nation) treatment underpins the central principle of GATT (that is, non-discrimination in 
trade). The principle stipulates that tariff preferences extended to one country in respect of a particular product 
should be extended to all other countries trading in the same product. 
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preferred partners ofthe EU outside its own region. This would correspond to level 6 in 
Table 4.2. Their current position at level 2 is a reflection of the diminished importance 
of the Lome Convention to the EU. In the case of South Africa, before the TDCA it 
occupied levelland improved markedly to level 4 after signing the TDCA with the EU. 
This is a position far better than level 2 position for the ACP group of countries. 
At the same time, South Africa is in a more preferred position vis-a.-vis EU cooperation 
-- - -"* 
than the Mediterranean countries which have also signed free trade agreements with the 
EU. The TDCA is qualitatively a more advanced agreement since it includes the farm 
sector whereas EU's trade-liberalizing agreements with southern Mediterranean states do 
not. Some observers have stated that the TDCA will boost South Africa's economic and 
political clout within the EU tremendously. For example, Islam (1999a: 47) observes that 
the TDCA will put South Africa's relations with the EU on a footing similar to Europe's 
high-level dialogue with major actors because it provides for regular political contacts of 
ajoint cooperation council at ministerial or senior official level as well as regular contacts 
between the European and South Africa parliaments. 
The bottom line is that two important and positive implications for SADC states are 
evident. The first is that the TDCA sets the stage for SADC-EU trade and development 
cooperation in the post-Lome future. SADC should welcome this as a positive 
development especially because South Africa will be negotiating as a member of SADC 
where its skills and overall clout will be aworthwhile asset. In any c,,"se this development 
fits in with EU policy towards developing states as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992. Under the Treaty, Graumans (1997: 12) observes, EU member states' trade and 
deVelopment policies were harmonised and made more complementary. This inevitably 
now means that the EU's competence extends ~p .nearly all trade issues and into aid 
matters. A further development ofthis, Koning (1997: 17) has argued, is that the ED trade 
policy is now concentrating on regional blocs. 
Supporting this view, Islam (1999b: 52) notes that the EU intends to replace Lome 
Convention with Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REP As) based loosely on 
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the TDCA negotiated with South Africa. This will obviously mark a clear departure with 
the past since the new REP As that will be modelled on the TDCA will have trade 
reciprocity as a central feature. This should be a logical development given the dismal 
performance of Lome Convention whose central feature has been non-reciprocal trade 
preferences for the entire ACP group (includes. all SADC states with South Africa as a 
qualified member). According to Islam (1999b: 53) the EU has already stated that the 
new partnership pacts will go into effect in 2005. 
The second positive implication of the TDCA on the SADC states can be explained in 
terms of skills resource that SADC states can draw from South Africa. Given South Africa 
is a member of SADC, and given that it has committed itself to safeguard the overall 
interests of Southern Africa region as being of fundamental interest to itself (Solomon 
1997), South Africa will be an important asset to SADC as the group engages in 
negotiations with the EU to determine the new framework for cooperation in the post-
Lome dispensation. That is, South Africa's experience derived from negotiating the TDCA 
can be applied effectively in any related negotiations between the EU and SADC states as ' 
a whole. 
Three more positive implications for SADC states can be outlined. First, it is instructive 
to note that the TDCA incorporated the feature of asymmetry and differentiation in 
consideration of the parties different levels of development. It follows that an SADC=ED 
REP A modelled on the TocA would allow for even greater asymmetry and 
differentiation given that SADC states are at much lower level of development than South 
Africa. Secondly, SADC would stand to benefit from the opening up ofEU agricultural 
sector as it is expected that the farm sector would also be included in the REP A. Finally, 
an SADC-EU REP A will be indicative of the wilHngness on the part of Southern Africa 
to embrace reform and trade liberalization and thereby encourage investment inflows to 
the region. 
Negative implications also exist. It has been argued (Southey 1999: 50) that because the 
TDCA offers preferential access of EU goods into the South African market, SADC 
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imports to South Africa will consequently suffer. Another negative implication affects 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (BNLS countries). These countries, also 
members of SADC, will suffer loss of customs revenue from the common Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) pool account. South Africa and BNLS states are linked 
together as partners under SACU. It is estimared (Southey 1999: 50) that the BNLS states 
could suffer declines in revenue of between R1.9 to R3.5 billion a year as a result oflower 
duties on EU goods and also because of the reduced levels of import duty gained on non-
EU goods as these reduce relative to the increased EU share of the SACUmarket. 
There are counter arguments to the issue of BNLS loss of customs revenue. It is argued 
that there is already acknowledgement within SACU that this form of financing is 
inefficient and unsustainable. Other views indicate that the loss in revenue will occur only 
gradually and given that the EU Commission is providing a "support package" the 
transitional difficulties for BNLS states will be substantially reduced (European Union 
News 1999: 5). It is further argued that most sensitive products are excluded from the 
TDCA and that the agreement has made provision for the protection of infant industries -
in both South Africa and the BNLS states through the incorporation of a safeguardchiuse 
that can always be invoked if the need arises (European Union News 1999:5). All 
indications suggest that an SADC-EU post-Lome cooperation would incorporate similar 
and possibly improved features. It is argued (Southey 1999: 50) by the business lobby 
group, SA Foundation, that Southern Africa should embrace the TDCA as it offers many 
opportunities for longer term bem~fit. 
In sum, it can be concluded that the net effect of the TDCA on the SADC states is in the 
long run going to be of beneficial nature. It is also clear that the EU is poised to make the 
TDCA the mode1 (with appropriate adjustments) for its future trade and development 
cooperation frameworks with developing countries and for these to take the form of 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements. Given the present close ties between South 
Africa and the EU, and given South Africa's commitment to cooperate with its 
neighbours to develop an effective growth and development strategy for Southern Africa, 
the SADC states for their part ought to embrace the TDCA. 
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It is evident that more than any other ACP group, the SADC bloc is in an advantageous 
position to develop a framework for negotiations with the EU given that South Africa, 
with its relatively extensive resources, is an inextricable part of the Southern Africa 
region. It is expected that SADC states (induding South Africa) have the desire andjoint 
interest to remain committed to their existing and still evolvingjoint institutions to enable 
achievement of integrative solutions. A more integrated region is better able to negotiate 
r- ~ 
cooperative arrangements with other integrated actors. Still, at the present level of 
integration, the institution of SADC remains coherent enough to constitute a framework 
capable of articulating joint positions in matters of trade and related issues. 
4.4 SADC as a Framework and Strategy for Negotiations with the European 
Union 
SADC as a framework and strategy for negotiations with the EU is here viewed in terms 
of a purposeful and deliberate plan for engaging the EU on specific issues of trade and 
related matters. Such a plan will constitute a range of foreign policy activities or policies 
in which many factors and actors play important roles. As such we do not envisage or 
argue for the existence of a common SADC foreign policy framework. We argue, 
however, that the absence of a common foreign policy framework within SADC does-not 
mean the absence of SADC foreign policy on specific issues. There are many instances 
in which SADC has demonstrated a unity in purpose and action with respect to specific 
issues. For our purposes, an SADC foreign policy action is considered to have taken place 
when the national foreign policies of member states are coordinated and expressed as a 
single position in.respect of a specific issue area. 
We focus mainly on the various dialogue methods or strategies of negotiations and 
positioning that SADC as a region can use in its interactions with the EU. The objective 
of such an endeavour being the attempt to improve the subregions's economic 
opportunities in the global economy. Our approach is informed by two important 
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considerations. First, for the sub-Saharan African countries, involvement in the global 
political economy is inevitable. Second, a regional response to problems of international 
trade and associated development problems (for example, the debt burden) is by far much 
better than individual state responses or responses on the basis of huge platforms such as 
the ACP grouping, the African Economic Community, the Group of 77 or the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). 
In the case of the first consideration, two reasons may be cited. First, as Southall 
(1999:163) argues, an indebted, poverty stricken, technologically backward Africa now 
has little chance of success striving for self-reliance and instead should engage with the 
world economy. He argues (1999: 163) that this approach still offers African states some 
degree of political and economic choice. Secondly, in order to engage effectively within 
the global political economy, the Southern African states will need to define their interests 
and their shared efforts within a regional context and articulate these on a regional 
platform. A regional approach to problems in the global political economy is especially 
-important in terms of coordinating strategies for response to shocks caused by economic -
globalization. 
Such an approach by Southern African region fits well within the region'S ongoing 
attempts to forge cooperative efforts towards establishment by 2004 of a fully integrated 
common market. This in itself is a manifestation of a working regime network !if the 
regional level. It is a realisation· that deliberate and purposive co.operative efforts to 
coordinate regional economic policies in the face of common problems will translate into 
mutual gain. 
Our attempt to examine SADC as a framework -for dialogue with the ED is informed 
within the simultaneous attempt to answer three important questions: Is SADC as a 
framework for cooperation with its new membership and an increased sense of purpose 
capable of wielding effective authority within a regional context? Are the SADC member 
states sufficiently committed to the overall aims and objectives of SADC such that they 
are willing and capable of coordinating within the SADC structures their externaltrade 
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policies? Is South Africa as the regional economic power-house committed enough to 
spearhead the effort for the achievement of SADC's overall aims and objectives? An 
examination of a joint regional foreign policy approach provides useful insight in the 
attempt to answer these questions. 
Foreign policy making is generally set within four distinct environments, namely; the 
domestic, the international, the psychological and the bureaucratic or organisational 0' ale 
,.... - _ ... 
and Mphaisha 1999: 90). Within these setting some variables that affect the range of 
foreign policy choices are resource endowments, level of economic development, geo-
strategic location, history and type of government (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997: 40-45). 
As Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (1999: 199) observe, the basic objectives ofa country's 
foreign policy are determined within a domestic context as the state attempts to secure 
national security, economic growth and the general welfare of its peoples. For SADC 
states, the domestic setting as a source of foreign policy is important especially in terms 
of the internal economic conditions of these states. ~s w~~ak, underdeveloped and 
therefore relatively poor states, SADC countries' individual trade foreign policies are 
considerably constrained. At the same time, the international environment imposes-severe 
constraints on the available foreign policy options for these states and especially because 
the external setting remains dynamic and not static in nature. 
Wright (1999: 2) correctly observes that traditional approaches to foreign policy making 
in Africa have significantly altered. He notes (1999: 2) that foreign policy was 
previously shaped by such factors as impact of colonialism, non-alignment, security and 
sovereignty, unity against apartheid and centralised decision-making among others. But 
presently, Wright (1999: 7) further notes, distinct reference points for African states' 
foreign policies are the end the Cold War, J:he pressures of liberalization and 
democratization, and the changing character of the global economy. Commenting on this 
new foreign policy environment facing the African states, Van Wyk (1994: 89) observes 
that the end of the Cold War has inevitably led to changes in non-aligned postures and that 
middle powers like South Africa will adopt regional leadership and bargaining roles in the 
North-South politics. The implication here is that multilateral platforms such as NAM, 
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the Group of 77 and UNCTAD have lost bargaining clout as the shift moves towards 
regionalism. This trend is in part a result of economic issues acquiring the status of high 
politics as strategic-military considerations become relatively less important in the post-
Cold War global economy. 
Shaw and Nyangoro (1999) have observed that in general, foreign policy making in 
Africa is faced with a radically changed post-Cold War global political economy now 
...- - _. 
preoccupied with structural change and adjustment. They note (1999: 237) that in this 
new setting there is a shift in terms of actors, issues and levels such that actors are now 
multiple and predominantly economic ones, issues mainly economic and the levels of 
policy making increasingly regional. 
These developments clearly suggest that concerns for economic viability at the sub-
system level have in essence rivalled military security issues. Commenting on this general 
shift, Van Wyk (1994: 81) stresses that the dominance of capitalism in the contemporary 
interdependent world has meant that foreign policy decision makers have now got to' 
balance the demands for domestic economic restructuring and growth with the need to 
achieve a competitive niche in international markets. While Van Wyk's observation is in 
respect of an individual state, we extend this view to the sub-system level as the 
appropriate decision-making or coordinating framework. 
It is necessary at this point to draw the distinction between what is t~rmed ajoint foreign 
policy and ajoint foreign policy activity. Ginsberg (1989: 2) defines ajoint foreign policy 
as a composition of mutually related joint actions that set forth a unified position intended 
to serve pre-determined objectives. In this regard he gives the example of the EC Middle 
East policy. On the other hand, he (1989: 2) defilles a joint foreign policy activity as a 
specific, conscious goal-oriented undertaking putting forth a unified membership position 
toward non-members, international bodies, international events and issues. For example, 
Ginsberg (1989: 2) observes that the EC took many foreign policy actions but had only a 
few fully developed foreign policies and that even those did not together constitute an 
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integrated foreign policy in the sense that a nation- state may be said to have a single 
foreign policy. 
But presently, Regelsberger et al (1997: 1-2) p~te that the EC, now as the EU following 
the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, has attained far greater levels of 
integration to the point that the EU now has many features of supranationality under the 
institution of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Therefore, !l~il}g the EU as 
an example and a point of departure, it cannot be expected that SADC can posses a foreign 
policy in the same way that a nation-state does since it is not a sovereign state. It follows 
therefore that even the joint actions of SADC member states on specific issues (in terms 
of Ginsberg's definition) will themselves not add up to a whole foreign policy of SADC 
as such. However, a joint action by SADC member states on a specific issue can be 
construed as a foreign policy action by the operationalization of the concept of "pooled 
sovereignty,,17 . 
The bottom line is that an SADC foreign policy activity may not be adequately explained 
by traditional conceptual approaches and that other explanations are required. These 
explanations or reference points for SADC foreign policy activity are externally driven 
events such as pressures of liberalization, global economic interdependence and the 
changing character of the global economy. It is nevertheless expected that each SADC 
member state has a set of domestic circumstances that will have an impact on each 
member's views on j oint foreign policy actions towards third parties. This suggests, as 
Babarinde (1999: 224) has noted, that an SADC foreign policy will be nothing more than 
an amalgamation of the foreign policies of member states (hence pooled sovereignty). 
-
It can be argued that given the level of international interdependence influenced by such 
international trends as economic globalization, pooled sovereignty on certain specific 
17 "Pooled Sovereignty" may be termed simply as a strategy of cooperation (facilitated within a multilateral 
framework such as the SADC grouping) which enables states to circumvent the problems caused by the lack of a 
supranational entity among them at the regional or international level. Kegley and Wittkopf (1997: 537) define 
"pooled sovereignty" as "the sharing of decision-making responsibility among several governments and between 
them and international institutions". 
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issues will increasingly become a common feature at the regional level. This trend will 
inevitably result in the strengthening of SADC as an existing regime for cooperation and 
therefore a framework for joint foreign policy activity. Whenever joint positions on 
specific issues are reached, the SADC member states will, in each time this happens, have 
utilised the leverage of collective action. Ginsberg (1989) refers to this approach as the 
maximisation of politics of scale18• 
...- - -'* 
Because of the evident paradigm shift in security conception in the post-Cold War 
environment towards greater focus on economic issues, it is conceivable that the apparent 
pervasiveness of economic issues on a global scale also implies that this trend will persist 
in temporal terms. If we accept this postulation as a given, it can be argued that an 
incremental SADC foreign policy activity towards external actors will increase and 
improve in quantitative and qualitative terms respectively. It would then follow that the 
quality of foreign policy actions will increasingly become a function of the quantity of 
issues dealt with. That is, as the number ofissues increase_Ciss,pe density) in which SADC 
enters into dialogue with such entities as the EU or United States, the quality of dialogue 
as well as the range of possible outcomes will get better incremental1y. Such a 
development will translate into opportunities in the global economy for SADC states as 
the group thus develops skills in negotiations and bargaining. 
There are a number of important dialogue areas or issues in which SADC foreign policy 
activity can be directed in respect of SADC contacts with the EU. These would form the 
basis of a calculated attempt to make a positive impact on the overall trade cooperation 
efficiency between them and in particular to improve on the competitiveness of SADC 
states in order to enable them to face the current competitive trading environment. For our 
--purposes we will identify three such issue areas and examine them by applying SADC as 
a framework and strategy for negotiations. But first we examine the appropriateness of 
18 Referring to the conduct of the EC foreign policy, Ginsberg (1989: 3) describes politics of scale as a facilitator 
of joint foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than when the participants act on their own. Babarinde 
(1999: 227) concurs, as he notes that members of a regional structure are inclined to use the regional framework 
for their foreign policy only when it serves their interests. These views reinforce the concept ofSADC as a 
working regime network and as a framework for articulating the region's joint positions on certain issues. 
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SADC as a framework for North-South dialogue as opposed to some previous and 
existing larger Third World dialogue platforms. 
We argue that effective negotiations on issues<~th the EU will require SADC as a group 
to exercise foresight and pragmatism. This will mean putting less emphasis in a structure 
such as the ACP grouping as a collective capable of bringing meaningful benefits to the 
Southern African region. Given its poor record as an institution meant J:o promote 
economic growth through trade facilitation, the ACP grouping is today similar to the 
Group of77 and NAM in that these groupings have become marginal in the current global 
economy. Some commentators lament the increased peripheralization of these 
organisations as facilitators for joint consultations and argue (Cheru 1996: 48) that neo-
liberal free market strategies have been offered as substitutes for multilateral 
consultations. This is really not the case since multilateral consultations have not yet lost 
their motive force. To the contrary we argue that a paradigmatic shift has occurred. That 
multilateral consultations have shifted focus and operatiol! leyel in order to become more 
effective and beneficial for the participants concerned. The dominant approach now is 
regionalism. An understanding of this shift by SADC group is an appreciation oftheheed 
to coordinate and harmonize their specific trade foreign policies and thereby strengthen 
their joint regional positions and responses. 
This suggested approach finds little merit in a strategy for the entire Third World or for 
huge sections of the Third World. Supporting one side of this view, Williams (1994: 24) 
argues that the uneven development of capitalism and the diverging economic fortunes of 
the Global South countries would suggest that these countries pursue individual interests 
rather than bloc goals. While correct in one respect (that is the jettisoning of perceived 
.. 
utility of huge blocs such as ACP or Group of77), Williams ignores the inherent weakness 
of most Third World states to attempt to individually integrate or position themselves in 
the world economy. 
In the case of trade and related issues, circumstances within the current global economy 
would suggest the pursuit by poor states of j oint goals but within much smaller groupings. 
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A common geographical setting and possession of several aspects of homogeneity adds 
weight to this approach. The increased integration and enlargement of the EU, the 
formation ofNAFTA, the formation of the Mercosur group19 and so forth are examples 
of responses in this direction. All these groups exhibit joint trade foreign policy actions 
towards third parties. Similarly, the membership expansion and progressing integration 
of SADC prepares it for increased joint foreign policy. activity. Babarinde (1999: 226) 
similarly argues that states participate in foreign policy enterprises within the framework 
of regional integration and cooperation because their interests are directfy ~r otherwise 
involved. 
The appropriateness of SADC as a selective framework for North-South dialogue at the 
regional level may however be said to be compromised by three situations. The first is in 
respect of the institutional capacity. As presently constituted, the institution of SA DC has 
a small staff. Babarinde (1999: 224) has noted that SADC lacks an elaborate bureaucracy 
with which to conduct foreign policy. Given that the target gate for a complete regional 
integration (creation of a free trade area) is 2004, a large bureaucracy for SADC is s~~ll a 
long while to come. 
The second compromising situation is the fact that SADC countries have not moved 
quickly enough to ratify important protocols under the SADC umbrella. For instance,_ tJIe 
important SADC trade protocol signed in 1996 is yet to be ratified by two thirds of 
SADC members, a requirement for the protocol's effectiveness. Especially important, 
the two strong regional economies, South Africa and Zimbabwe, should pave the way in 
the ratification of protocols. McGowan (1999: 255) has stated that the SADC trade 
protocol will not come to much until it is signed by Zimbabwe and South Africa because 
.. 
of the size and importance of their economies in the region. Finally, McGowan (1999: 
19 Mercosur is the Latin American trade bloc made up of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile is an 
associate member. The group's objective is to promote trade between the member states (NeJ and Mcgowan 1999: 
323). 
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255) charges that many SADC states belong to competing organisations20 that divert 
attention from SADC' s goal of greater economic cooperation. He has argued (1999: 256) 
that the fact that the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 
the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (lOR-ARC) both seek 
greater economic integration among their members has implications on the coordination 
efficiency and prioritisation for SADC states and may result in sub-optimal focus on 
issues at the SADC level. 
Despite these possible drawbacks the distinctiveness of the Southern Africa subsystem 
will continue to propel SADC as the most coherent and consistent regional organisation 
on the continent. The sub-system' s distinctive past in terms of mutual sensitivity and 
familiarity (especially the intergovernmental experiences made possible within the Front 
Line States and SADCC arrangements) suggest that petrifugal forces in the institution of 
SADC will predominate as member states move closer towards economic integration. 
This development coupled with the now obvious trend towar<isregionalism makes SADC 
the most appropriate platform on which the region should articulate its positions on 
important trade issues within a selective North-South framework. 
By using SADC as a regional framework for negotiations with the EU on important trade 
and related issues the interests of SADC states will therefore be jointly and positiy~ly 
affected. This can be illustrated by an examination of three possible dialogue areas. 
These are as follows: the issue regarding the type of relationship the EU will have with the 
ACP countries after expiry of Lome Convention in February 2000; considerations for 
SADC states to adopt (within a cooperation agreement with the EU) "strategic" as 
20 Currently ten SADC members have overlapping membership with the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) originally founded in 1981. At the same time three SADC members (South Africa, 
Mozambique and Tanzania) also belong to the newly created Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-
operation (lOR-ARC) (McGowan 1999: 255). 
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opposed to "close" integration21 with the world economy; and negotiations over debt 
cancellation of the EU portion of the crippling debt to SADC states. 
Regarding the first issue or dialogue area, negotiations between the ACP group and the EU 
~ :. r 
are already in progress. In an interim report in May 1997 (Graumans 1997: 2) a 
preliminary SADC joint position favoured the retention of the status quo of the Lome 
Convention. This is not an informed decision. A more realistic and ~n fact strategic 
position by SADC would be to favour a regionally differentiated approach to cooperation 
with the EU and to accept a measure of reciprocity in a new SADC-EU cooperation. Such 
an approach would be a departure from past negotiation mistakes made by, for example, 
the Group of77 whereby, Rothstein (1977: 153) observes, the group sought concessions 
from the rich countries but failed to offer any reciprocal benefits to them. 
Table 4.3 A Comparison of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Three 
Prominent sub-Saharan Regional Economic Groupings 
GROUP 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Economic Community of West African States (ECO WAS) 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
GDP($bn) 
182.89 
91.40 
28.53 
Source: Adapted from Sikhakhane, J. 1999. "Indulging in a Daydream?: Regional Trade 
Pacts Flawed", Financial Mail, May 21, pp.52-53. 
21 As supporters of heterodox interpretation of the East Asian experience, Dut et al (1994) posit that the 
East Asian countries pursued 'strategic" integration with the world economy during their periods of 
rapid growth. They argue (1994: 14) that this involved, among other things, a whole range of 
government measures to guide the market towards planned structural change. That is, governments in 
these countries followed strong, purposeful industrial policies with public enterprises playing a 
significant role. 'Close' integration on the other hand means simply following the market. 
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What is important for SADC countries is to appeal to the self interest of the EU. One way 
of doing this is to present Southern African region as an attractive trade partner as well as 
a lucrative destination of foreign direct investment. For instance, table 4.3 clearly 
indicates that among the key trade blocs in the sub-Saharan Africa, the SADC group is 
the largest economic player with a gross domestic product of US Dollars 182.89 billion 
which is twice the size of the second largest, ECOWAS group US Dollars 91.40 billion. 
The presence of South Africa in SADC as a strong middle-income economic actor makes 
Southern African region even more attractive. At the same time it gives -SAnC group 
additional political and economic leverage relative to the other groups on the continent. 
In terms of negotiations with the EU this translates into an important foreign policy asset. 
Further, using the political and economic weight of South Africa, SADC states are now 
in a unique position to negotiate an arrangement with the EU modelled on the SA-EU 
TDCA. Within such an arrangement SADC will be able to negotiate for the incorporation 
of improved features of asymmetry and differentiation to take cognizance of the relative 
low level of development of the SADC states. Asymmetrywifioe in respect of provisions 
for relative reciprocity. Differentiation will deal with the question of the transitional phase 
for tariff reductions by the partners where the weaker partners reduce tariffs over a much 
longer period. SADC states are therefore in a position to grasp the opportunity to negotiate 
a lucrative post-Lome deal with the EU in the form of Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreement (REP A). 
A REP A between SADC and the EU would serve to institutionalize negotiations on an 
on-going basis by way of creating institutional links for a long-term relationship. 
Sandberg and Shambaugh (1993: 160) have argued that success in respect ofN orth-South 
negotiations requites the establishment of an institution in which bargaining takes place 
routinely. They argue (1993: 170) that within-'a continuous bargaining framework 
afforded by institutional links, incremental expansion of issue-areas can take place with 
greater chance for success than would be the case in a major one-off negotiation 
demanding drastic changes (such as those made by the Group of77). 
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A second possible dialogue area would be one in which SADC negotiates for certain 
safety clauses within a REP A with the ED. Among other uses, such safety clauses would 
provide room for SADC states to adopt strategic as opposed to close integration with the 
world economy. By this we do not suggest that the state should supplant the market but 
rather that SADC states are too fragile to siri:\ply follow the dictates of the market. As 
much as international trade is an important aspect of the much hailed export-led growth, 
it is vitally important to focus, Tsie (1996: 98) argues, on the need to promote balance, 
equity and mutual benefit in order to promote social development and poverly eradication. 
This view suggests that while SADC should project a market friendly posture in its 
foreign policy activities, "strong" regional states must not be compromised. 
Therefore SADC as a framework for negotiation with the EU can ensure that SADC-EU 
REP A does not weaken the Southern African states. Tsie (1996: 97) correctly observes 
that the SADC region needs strong states with sufficient autonomy and capacity to 
institutionalize sustained capitalist development. This view accepts the role and 
importance of non-state actors in the current global political ectinomy, but as Grant (1997: 
321) argues, it is too early yet to proclaim a "Borderless World,m. It is suggested thatthe 
state and the market be viewed not as competing but complementary institutions. Of 
particular note is the fact that SADC states (with industry-specific exceptions in the case 
of South Africa) are too weak and vulnerable to allow unrestrained market complete 
autonomy. Strong regional states will be vital in guiding the market towards planned 
structural change by a series of market friendly, interventionist but essentially regulatory 
measures. 
Finally, a third possible dialogue area would be on the critical issue of debt cancellation. 
As a framework f9r the articulation of regional positions, SADC can play an important 
role in respect of the debt question. For example, -the group can utilize the political and 
other links that would be established within the proposed SADC-EU REP A to lobby the 
22 "Borderless World" is the title of a book by Kenichi Ohmae (1991) in which the central argument is a focus on 
globalization as a function of global market forces in which the role ofthe state is completely rolled back. But the 
approach in this thesis is that this view overstates the impact of globalization. The role of the state as a regulatory 
agency at the national, regional and intemationallevels is still crucial. The surge in sub-groupism (Rosenau 1997), 
that is, economic trade blocs, is one method by which states continue to wield regulatory capacity whether they are 
weak states such as the SADC group or strong states such as those of the EU or NAFT A. 
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ED to write-off the portion of SADC debt owed to its members and institutions. Other 
debt elimination mechanisms such as debt-equity swaps can also be negotiated. It is 
expected that the ED might place certain conditions in respect of debt cancellations. Likely 
conditions may take the form of a demand for a clear demonstration of good political as 
well as economic governance and accountability on the part of SADC countries prior to 
any debt cancellations. 
Given the general wave of democratisation in the region, except in the case of Angola 
where civil war has reversed this process, such a condition has a fair chance of being met 
by most SADC states. Also, South Africa's fairly successful democratic consolidation is 
a useful asset for negotiation in this regard. Through demonstration effect (that is, by 
example) Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (1999: 201) argue that the successful democratic 
consolidation in South Africa has impacted the region positively in terms of promoting 
regional norms of democracy and human rights. They note (1999: 201) that as the 
regional economic powerhouse, South Africa expresses i!s c£,)J1mitment to regionalism 
and hence regional integration in Southern Africa. If this rhetoric is translated into 
practical and harmonised policy actions within the SADC regional framework, it 
becomes a strong negotiating asset for Southern Africa. A politically stable and 
economically prosperous Southern Africa makes an attractive cooperating partner for the 
ED. Debt relief will contribute positively to this endeavour. 
Debt relief for SADC states would also go a long way towards improving their export 
performance. Resources untied by debt cancellation by the ED can be invested in skills 
development as a deliberate and purposeful long-term strategy to enhance technology 
transfer. In tum, acquired requisite skills would be applied to the efforts of diversifying 
the export product base as a necessary strategy to improve SADC trade performance. The 
ED's professed commitment (Fouere 1997: 34; Ismail 1997: 88) to support the 
development and regional integration of the Southern African region should be seen to be 
part of this process. Similarly, South Africa's professed commitment (Keet 1997: 124) 
to protect the interests of the region in negotiations with the ED should also be part of this 
process. Other commentators (Shaw 1997: 35) specifically charge that South Africa 
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should show its usefulness by negotiating on behalf of the region on issues that affect the 
region's capacity to integrate with the world economy. 
4.5 Con~~sion 
The post-Cold War paradigm shift in security conception away from military strategic 
issues towards greater focus on economic issues is now a dominant characteristic of the 
present international system. Within this paradigm shift other sub-themes have 
manifested themselves in ways that critically affect the economic prospects of the sub-
Saharan countries. The new world order resulting from this dominant shift is 
characterised by donor fatigue and decline in real spending on development assistance. 
Relations of the poor sub-Saharan states with the creditor nations and international 
financial institutions is shown to have been substantially altered so that "trade and not aid" 
is the accompanying theme of the 1990' s and beyond. Along this thinking, the Lome 
Convention's non-reciprocal trade arrangements have lost rel~vance and are about to be 
replaced by a new cooperative arrangement radically different in form and substanc~. This 
is further buttressed by the evidence of extensive failure on the part of Lome arrangement 
to improve trade prospects of the ACP countries. The uniqueness and innovativeness of 
the SA-EU trade pact has been shown to have net positive effects on the SADC countries. 
The trade pact's inclusion of the agriculture domain and its features of asymmetry ~d 
differentiation makes it an attractive model for SADC-EU cooperation in the post-Lome 
dispensation. 
In an environment which has substantially rolled back economic sovereignty of the 
individual sub-Saharan African state, regionalism, it is argued, offers an alternative way 
for Southern African states to position themselves in the global political economy. At the 
same time the market should not be allowed free reign. Strong regional states will be 
necessary to ameliorate the adverse effects of liberalization by guiding the market towards 
a planned structural change. This approach sees little relevance for the SADC group to 
attempt to use larger Third World forums such as the Group of 77, NAM or the ACP 
grouping to curve out a niche for itself in the world economy. With South Africa in its 
72 
midst, SADC is in a unique position to utilize South Africa's present good will (including 
its new and innovative relationship with the EU) as well as its relatively better resources, 
to articulate regional positions on important trade and related issues. Such an approach, 
which should be characterised by a joint foreign policy activity by the member states 
(under the auspices of SADC as the framework for negotiation) reflects a general trend in 
the global economy. 
While the SADC institution is fairly small in terms of bureaucratic capacity, the political 
will to coordinate member states' external trade policies nevertheless exists. Many 
instances of this can be cited. One such example discussed in the chapter (but considered 
unpragmatic in the view of this thesis) is the preliminary SADC joint position that 
favoured the retention of the Lome status quo. On the issue of regional leadership it has 
been shown that South Africa is committed to play the leadership role. For instance, in 
its negotiations with the EU it emphasized the fundamental significance to itself of 
SACU and other SADC members in respect of strategic, political, security, trade and 
development relations with them. 
From a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that SADC as a framework for 
negotiation can effectively be employed not only in the case of interactions with the EU, 
but also in the case of SADC interactions with the US (a huge export market and a. 
potential source of various types of trade and investment accommodations). As we 
pointed out, the US is a central actor in the global political economy and especially in 
respect of its influence over the regulatory processes of global trade and international 
financial institutions. The US is also deeply involved in the issues surrounding such 
themes as the linkage between aid and politico-economic reforms. Within the context of 
.. 
the new US Africa policy, the next chapter explores further the possibility that Si\DC's 
innovative interactions with dominant external actors could result in beneficial outcomes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SADC-United States Relations: Opportunities and Risks 
Current wisdom in the sphere of international political economy suggests that even the very 
poorly performing economies of the Third Wodd, mostly in the sub-Saharan Africa, should 
direct their efforts towards finding ways and means to integrate with the world economy. 
SADC states seek economic development based on equality and social justice. They seek 
export-led growth through sustainable trade and investment. As such, SADC states must 
engage with the world economy. Recent SADC trade and economic contacts or relations 
with the US should be seen as part of this process. However, there are challenges in the form 
of risks and opportunities associated with this process. 
For instance, the US Africa policy is now based on the new thinking epitomised by the slogan 
"trade-not-aid". Within this thinking, the objectives of the US me to promote democracy and 
prosperity in Africa, and through that, its own national interest. Through its influence over 
the regulatory processes of global trade and international financial institutions, the US has 
increasingly pushed for the linkage between aid and politico-economic reforms. The US 
goals are well facilitated within the larger framework of globalization and liberalization 
which has given rise to the primacy of the market. The dominance of market capitalism in 
the contemporary world of complex interdependence necessitates SADC states to restructure 
their economies and to adopt policies aimed at achieving a competitive niche in international 
markets. However, to achieve this objective; certain requirements might be necessary 
regarding the type of the individual Southern African state as a politico-economic 
organizational unit. In any event, SADC states will need to use the political and economic 
weight of South Afri-€a to negotiate beneficial partne!,ships with the US. The successful 
democratic transition provides South Africa with reasonable political clout and goodwill in 
this regard. 
Part one of this chapter discusses the new US policy towards Africa in general and how the 
SADC states in particular stand to benefit from it. Also discussed is the US Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act as an important instrument of the US Africa policy. The implications of 
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the Act's conditionalities on Southern African trade and development prospects are critically 
examined in the second part. Finally, the type of SADC states (that is, as politico-economic 
organizational units or as specific types of political economies) necessary for coping with the 
intense global competition as well as for the articulation of regional positions on matters of 
trade and related issues are discussed. This discussion is conducted within the assumption 
that South Africa is well positioned and willing to provide regional leadership, both 
politically and economically. 
It is argued that while the US Africa policy is innovative, fundamentally it advances the 
interests of market capitalism. To benefit from this policy Southern Africa will need to 
articulate joint policy positions in trade relations with the US where these positions enhance 
the capacity to determine the level of state intervention in the economy.Accordingly, SADC 
sta~es will need to reconstitute their political economies in order to curve out a middle way 
necessarry in coping with inescapable insecurities of global capitalism. Leadership by South 
Africa will have to be a vital component ofthis strategy. -
5.1 United State's Africa Policy: An Opportunity for SADC States to Enhance Trade 
Contacts with United States 
Under the second phase of Clinton Administration US Africa policy has undergone a 
tremendous change compared to that witnessed during the Cold War period. In the three 
decades prior to 1990 the US viewed the entire continent through a Cpld War prism This 
therefore meant that foreign aid and other forms of assistance basically served US political 
goals. In looking at how SADC states can benefit in terms of trade from a renewed US Africa 
policy, it is important, as Strange (1988: 161) cautions, to always begin from a position of 
facts so far as they are known and then proceed to tl)e conflicting issues on trade and related 
matters. This approach is useful, Strange (1988: 161) argues, because facts help to put into 
perspective the way in which the flows, the content and terms of international trade are so 
heavily dependent on other structures such as security, production (that is mode of 
production), finance and technology (or knowledge). This suggests that exchanges in 
international trade are far from being merely the outcome of market forces of relative supply 
and demand. Much more to the point, international trade exchanges are the result, Strange 
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(1988: 161) asserts, ofa complex and interlocking network of bargains that are partly 
economic and partly political, involving the unequal access of trading partners to both finance 
and technology. 
It is important to note, Cason (1997: 148) observes, that US Africa policy has always been 
driven by national interest calculations. This is an important fact. Following the end ofthe 
Cold War, the prism through which the US viewed Africa has been shattered: This too is 
another important fact. As Cason (1997: 148) argues, in the post-Cold War era US foreign 
policy priorities towards Africa have shifted toward other political goals such as supporting 
the transition to market economies or cultivating warm relations with new important 
governments such as South Africa and addressing humanitarian crises. It is also possible to 
argue that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of Communism has 
giv~n a new impetus to the neoliberal perspective. From this, other facts can also be drawn. 
As Mengisteab (1995: 164) observes, much ofthe North-South economic interaction now 
take place within the framework of liberalization as the dominant ideology. Further, 
Mengisteab (1995: 164) notes, influenced mainly by the US, the other industrial powers and 
the powerful multilateral institutions (mainly the IMF and the World Bank) now use 
liberalization as a condition for the integration of Global South economies into the global 
economic system. 
In dealing with the US on matters of political economy, this set of facts are critically - - . 
important for any state or a group of states, whether poor or of middle income status. For 
SADC states, recognising the influential role of the US in the multilateral dimension of 
political economy is a good starting point for any dialogue with it. In the attempts to establish 
new post-Cold War links with African states, the US for its part has made bold new steps in 
this direction. In the 1994 White House Conference on Africa, President Clinton stated 
- . 
(Clough 1994:2) that the US has a new responsibility to see Africa as specific natiOns with 
specific problems and as specific promises. The President specifically used South Africa as a 
reference point (Clough 1994: 2) for hope on the continent, as well as throughout the world, 
and emphasized US role to provide practical and meaningful assistance to ensure such hope 
remains aglow. Since South Africa is an inextricable part of the Southern African 
subsystem, increased US focus on South Africa inevitably implies opening up opportunities 
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for greater US contacts (essentially trade and investment opportunities) with the rest of SA DC 
states. 
In the same White House Conference on Africa, the Vice-President, AI Gore, cited two 
important regional initiatives undertaken by the US in Southern Africa through the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). These two initiatives are a Southern 
Africa Enterprise Fund to encourage indigenous private sector development and a Southern 
Africa Democracy Fund to strengthen participatory democracy in the subregion (Clough 
1994: 3). If SADC states can respond adequately to these initiatives, Southern African 
region is set to become a major growth centre on the continent. The US focus on Southern 
Africa and particularly on South Africa has been extensive. It has been instrumental in the 
funding of structures in South Africa that target the strengthening of democratic institutions, 
creation of jobs, and redressing inequities of the past such as healthcare, housing, education 
system and so forth (Clough 1994: 5). At the regional level and working closely with SADC 
in recent years, the US has contributed funds to strengthen economic ties to capitalize small 
businesses and to improve transportation and communication systems (Clough 1994: 5). 
This represents a window of opportunity for the region to institute appropriate trad<?policies 
and initiatives to take advantage of this renewed US focus on Southern Africa. 
All these initiatives in Southern Africa by the US are useful as they contribute to the 
establishment of an enabling environment in which sustainable development and international 
trade can take place. Yet there is little development, much less international trade, that can 
take place if conflicts such as those in the Democratic Republic of the. Congo (DRC) and 
Angola continue. This critical dimension of development (that is maintenance of a security 
structure within states and regions) has also received attention within the framework of the 
new US Africa policy 
Clough (1994: 4) notes that a comprehensive legislation (the African Conflict Resolution 
Act) has already been introduced in Congress. Representative Harry Johnston (Chairman, 
Sub-committee on Africa House Foreign Affairs Committee) has stated (Clough 1994: 4) that 
this initiative aims to provide assistance to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conflict 
prevention, management and resolution efforts, to sub-regional organizations (such as SADC) 
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and to non-governmental organizations involved in mediation in Africa. This initiative 
indicates the sensitivity of the US Africa policy to the need for political stability as this is 
vital to the establishment of trade and investment links. SADC is reasonably well 
constituted in terms of regional security arrangements with a great deal of potential for 
improvement. The SADC security structure, the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, has 
been reasonably active in peace initiatives and intervention in Lesotho and the DRC. 
Therefore, constructive engagement with the US under the auspices of the US Africa policy 
will strengthen regional peace and security initiatives as a critical dimension of trade. 
In recognition of the dire need for funds by the majority of African countries, the Clinton 
Administration is also making efforts in this direction, but against stiff opposition from the 
Republican controlled Congress. Traditionally the sub-Saharan African countries have 
benefitted from the almost interest-free long-term project loans extended by the International 
Development Association (IDA), a subsidiary of the World Bank. But as Cason (1997: 147) 
observes, Congress has effectively withdrawn all IDA funding to the poorest countries for the 
- -
three year period beginning in 1997. Cason (1997: 147) notes that as a measure of support for 
the US Africa policy, the Clinton administration is lobbying Congress to restore IDAfuiIding 
for the poorest countries. The funds in question are the one billion dollars annual US 
appropriation to IDA. The Republican-controlled Congress would rather have these funds be 
applied to cut the federal budget deficit. 
Whatever the US national interest might be in its renewed Africa policy, it is vitally important 
for strategic subregions such as Southern Africa to take cognizance oftlle dynamics of US 
behaviour towards the Third World. In doing so, certain specific benefits can be negotiated 
and extracted. Krasner (1985: 23) points out that Democratic US Administrations have tended 
to accept reformist liberal arguments (for example Jimmy Carter Administration) while 
Republicans have largely preferred orthodox liberal perspectives. The result has been that 
.' 
Democratic Administrations have been more sympathetic to the plight of poor African states. 
The further marginalisation of Africa during the Republican Administration of President 
Reagan puts this argument into perspective. 
For instance, on the question of the global campaign to forgive debt to the Highly Indebted 
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Poor Countries (RIPC), the current US Democratic Administration has demonstrated great 
support for this endeavour. In this regard, it is noted (Brummer 1999: 19) that President 
Clinton has urged the Republican Congress to approve a hundred percent of US bilateral 
debts to the HIPC group. He also appealed to the World Bank, IMF and other lenders to 
Gonsider total debt relief to HIPC before the end of the millennium (Brummer 1999: 19). It 
follows therefore that the current Democratic Administration of President Clinton is 
sympathetic and willing to mobilise assistance (political and capital) on behalf of'Africa, even 
"vithin the framework of US national interest. But since Africa is not one homogenous 
rentity, despite certain similar problems, those that stand to benefit from the current US Africa 
policy will be those countries andlor regions that position themselves strategically. 
The most critical component of the US Africa policy is the shift from aid to trade and 
investment cooperation. This is a policy supposedly informed by the thinking that export~led 
growth holds the promise for the poor African countries. The US trade~not-aid policy is the 
engine that is driving the draft bill African Growth and Opportunity Act sponsored by, among 
"- ..;;.,...--
others, representative Phil Crane and Senator Richard Lugar. This new US policy towards 
Africa has certain shortcomings and constructive criticism should be levelled accerdingly. It 
should, at the same time, be seen by those it concerns most (the targeted African states) as a 
new and iImovative move to initiate serious and sustained dialogue on Africa's problems and 
challenges and coming as it does from a sympathetic Democratic Administration. Major 
developments in the direction of increased high level contacts between specific African 
countries andlor specific regions and the US are therefore expected. Clough (1994: 1) 
concludes that the first-ever White House Conference on Africa in June 1994 achieved both 
its objective of focusing the attention of senior administration officials (especially President 
Clinton) on Africa and enlisting interested US groups in a concerted effort to assist Africa. 
SADC states are well positioned to benefit from the rellewed US focus on Africa. With South 
Africa (the strongest economy on the continent) as a central player in Southern Africa, the 
subregion commands strategic importance. This is so not least because of the democracy 
promise demonstrated by the 1994 South African landmark transformation and followed by 
the successful multi-party democratic elections in June 1999. The successful consolidation of 
democracy and the positive potential it possesses in terms of "demonstration effect" on 
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~gional countries, accords the subregion a new importance in the global political economy. 
Because of this demonstrable importance of the subregion, a number of useful contacts 
between the region and the US have already occurred. First was the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by the SADC Executive Secretary and the late US Secretary of 
Commerce, Ron Brown, in February 1996. The Memorandum aimed at promoting trade and 
economic relations between the US and SADC and identified agri-business, manufacturing 
md mining as some of the areas of focus (SADC 1997: 1). A second important contact took 
place in April 1997. In this contact a mission to the US of a delegation of SADC trade and 
industry ministers met with the new US Secretary of Commerce, William Daley, and senior 
US officials who outlined the details of the US commercial policy for Africa (SADC 1997: 1). 
In yet another high-level contact (Sharpe 1998: 3) William Daley, US Secretary of 
Commerce, led a trade delegation of fifteen US business leaders to the Southern African 
region in December 1998. At the same time, notes Sharpe (1998: 3), an agreement which 
aims to promote investment between the US and South Africa was signed by South Africa's 
Trade Minister and US Commerce Secretary. It can be argued that this bilateral arrangement 
is an indication of South Africa's centrality in these contacts. 
These sustained contacts culminated in the establishment of the US-SADC Forum in April 
1999 in Botswana, the seat of SADC headquarters. Again this took place within the 
framework of high-level contact involving the US Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, Stuart Eizenstart, who led a delegation of private businessmen and one hundred 
representatives often US government agencies (The Reporter 1999: 2). It can be argued that 
these high-level commercial initiatives on the part of the US signal the upgrading of Southern 
Africa in US commercial foreign policy. It is also an indication of the region's strategic 
importance as the part of Africa with the greatest potential for economic growth and 
consolidation of democracy and hence political stabil~tr: 
For these high-level contacts to translate into substantive gains for Southern Africa, the 
•. region must critically assess the US trade-not-aid policy and the conditions underlying the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. When this is done, the region can then engage the US 
creatively within such structures as the US-SADC Forum and US-South Africa Binational 
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Commission23 established by the high-level contacts. In this way the region can negotiate and 
bargain for specific trade and investment needs by taking joint positions on issues. Seen from 
this perspective the US Africa policy constitutes a window of opportunity for Southern Africa 
to improve its trade with the US by opening up c1}apnels of technology, capital and 
investments inflows to the region. The improved economic performance in the region arising 
from these resource inflows would then enhance the region's trade with the US as the latter 
removes barriers to trade for SADC products. However, the fundamentals oftht; Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act must first be understood. 
5.2 'United States Conditionalities and Trade Implications for Southern Africa 
The US Africa policy, as represented by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, is on the 
whole more a reflection of the furtherance of US national interest than a new enlightenment 
about the need to uplift the poor states of Africa. It ~s a new foreign policy greatly influenced 
by domestic as much as by international political and econOlp.ic £ircumstances. As Cason 
(1997: 148) has observed, there has been increasing domestic pressure since the late 1980's 
on the US to end government assistance programs even to US citizens. In such a domestic 
environment the US is hard-pressed to justify development assistance to Mrica. On the other 
hand, the US foreign aid program, as Cason (1997: 148) points out, has always been an 
adjunct to Washington's political and economic interests or security. Commenting on the 
central objective of the new US Africa trade and foreign aid policy, Vice President Al Gore 
made this clear when he asserted: . 
It is a three-pronged vision: one that seeks to promote 
democracy, promote prosperity, and promote our own 
national securitY in an age when the Berlin Wall has 
.. been dismantled and people are casting ballots in the 
Kremlin (Clough 1994: 3). 
23The high level contacts between the US and SADC are largely a result of US interest in South Africa's peaceful 
political transition and its value as a model for other unstable regions. The US-South Africa Binational Commission is part 
of this process. This presents a window of opportunity for Southern Africa where South Africa's goodwill and political clout 
should work as a bargaining resource. 
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It is argued (Cason 1997: 148) that these perceptions and objectives of foreign aid place a 
demand on US assistance to be justified first and foremost by how well it advances short-
term US political and economic interests. Long-term economic progress for African states is 
not given much consideration if at all any. As Cason (1997: 151) notes, the trend in US 
-: r 
economic aid has been to re-direct so called "development assistance" budget for Africa 
toward very short-term humanitarian relief or medium-term relief projects. Development 
assistance to Africa through trade and development cooperation is planned 1Q lle achieved 
within the framework of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. However, a critical 
assessment of the fundamentals of the draft bill has revealed serious deficiencies in terms of 
the bill's ability to assist African countries. 
First and foremost the draft bill has been criticized (Martin 1998: 532) for its reproduction of 
IMF and other international financial institutions' conditionalities. Yet, as Martin (1998: 532) 
aptly observes, documented evidence abound on how conditions imposed by IMF and 
associated institutions have resulted in increased poverty, in~qu~!ty and unstable economies. 
It is these negative outcomes, Martin (1998: 532) further notes, that have led to widespread 
opposition to IMF and World Bank reform-conditioned structural adjustment funds by 
African democratic movements, church groups, women's organizations and so forth. 
Because of its unilateralism and imposition ofIMF-type conditions, the US Africa trade bill 
has been severely criticized by a broad spectrum of Africa advocacy organizations and 
scholars. These include Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica, Association of Concerned 
African Scholars, among others. 
A TransAfrica letter signed by twenty eight prominent African Americans (Congressional 
leaders, academics and so forth), has levelled specific criticisms and proposed specific 
amendments to the bilL that, in their view, would make it viable and pro-development 
oriented. The letter summarizes the bill's conditions in three categories (SAPEM 1998: 2). 
Firstly, the bill seeks compliance with IMF rules which include cuts in domestic spending and 
corporate tax rates and broad privatization through divestiture. Secondly, it demands 
compliance with WTO rules such as deep tariff cuts, systematic removal of import 
restrictions and subsidies (including those relating to agriculture and food) and opening of 
service sectors (communications, transportation, banking and so forth) to allow unlimited 
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foreign acquisitions while limiting government regulation. Thirdly, the bill demands 
establishment of new rights for foreign investors to acquire ownership over Africa's natural 
resources and land, and for treatment of such foreign investors equal to treatment of local 
African businesses. 
The condition to cut domestic spending is criticized for not being based on a sound policy 
that takes cognizance of the unique circumstances in most African countries. The TransAfrica 
~- ~ 
letter (SAPEM 1998: 28) argues that many African countries have found that substantial 
public investment in education, health care and infrastructure-building creates a solid 
foundation for vigorous economic development and therefore demand for cuts in these areas 
is misinformed. Other proponents of this view (McGowan 1991: 9) point out that a critical 
mass of highly skilled people, developed communication and transportation structures will be 
the guarantee for wealth generation in the new millennium. The letter (SAPEM 1998: 28) has 
also argued that Africa is the only developing region in which school attendance rates are 
declining and this being directly related to the collapse of public investment. The letter 
- ~~ 
(SAPEM 1998: 28) further argues that the demand for cuts in corporate taxes is equally 
misinformed and is an application of double standards as countries around the world use 
corporate taxes extensively to finance essential public services. The letter (SAPEM 1998: 29) 
also criticizes the demand for compliance with WTO rules despite evidence that WTO' s tariff 
escalation on finished products would undermine development by African countries of 
diversified economies with value-added processing industries. As such, the immediate reality 
is that the bill's demands pr~sent more risks than opportunities for African countries. 
The US Africa trade bill provides for quota free, duty free access to the US market for textile 
and apparel goods shipped from Africa. The TransAfrica letter (SAPEM 1998: 30) criticizes 
this provision for not .. being specific enough to ensure new investments in this important trade 
(that is, trade in which most poor African countries have comparative advantage) or Jhat 
African labour is actually utilized. Instead, under the current terms of the bill, goods 
transhipped via Africa but produced in a third country such as China would still qualify for 
entry into the US market (SAPEM 1998: 30). The magnitude of this single problem is 
illustrated by the fact that the American Textile manufacturers Institute (ATMI) has re-
affirmed its opposition to the Africa trade bill because it also finds its opportunity to invest in 
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Africa being compromised by the transhipment problem (SAPEM 1998: 30). 
The bottom line ofthese criticisms is that if the bill's objective of shifting US relationship 
with Africa from aid to trade and investment is to be achieved, a number of amendments must 
-:. -F 
be put in place. The TransAfrica letter (SAPEM 1998: 30) suggests amendments at two 
levels. First, that the language of the bill be changed to state that the listed economic and 
social policies are policy guidelines and not conditionalities. Second, that some specific 
provisions be deleted including the requirements for material compliance with IMP, 
compulsory WTO membership, binding tariffs to WTO levels, reduction of corporate taxes 
and government spending, treatment of foreign investors equal to local businesses, and 
privatization of government-controlled assets through divestiture. It is argued (Martin 1998: 
532) that in its current form the bill becomes an instrument for stripping African countries of 
their democratic right to institute the most basic of economic policy decisions, while the US 
and its multinational corporations dictate trade and investment rules. 
Because of the importance of investment in textile and app~el manufacturing in Africa, the~ 
TransAfrica letter (SAPEM 1998: 31) has stated that the bill must be amended to ad~: -,' 
comprehensive provisions banning transhipment through Africa (duty and quota-free) of 
goods manufactured in third countries; the requirement that goods must contain sixty percent 
African value-added to obtain duty-free, quota-free access; the requirement that companies 
must have fifty-five percent African ownership and African workers to comprise at least 
ninety percent of plant wor~orceforgoods to obtain duty-free, quota-free treatment. 
If incorporated, these amendments will greatly benefit nearly all SADC countries as well as 
those on the continent with similar economic structures. 
Given the high-level contacts that have already taken place between the US and Southern 
.. 
Africa, it can be argued that the US would like to implement the US-Africa trade bill in the 
~ 
subregion before it is implemented anywhere else. However, given the bill's shortcomings, it 
would be imprudent on the part of SADC countries to immediately embrace it without 
caution. But since the bill simultaneously represents an important opportunity for trade and 
development cooperation with a major actor in the global economy, the immediate objective 
for SADC would be to lobby and negotiate for its amendment. So far the TransAfrica letter 
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represents the best framework on which the bill should be amended t6 alter the excessive 
"Washington consensus,,24 perspective on which it is based. 
5.3 An Alternative Form of Political Economy for Southern Africa 
As analysed in the Trans Africa letter the new US Africa policy is simply another facet of the 
liberalization agenda setting the strong against the weak. At the centre of the agenda is the 
deliberate attempt to completely diminish the regulatory capacity of the African state and 
especially the capacity as well as the sovereign right to institute trade and economic policies 
that reflect local circumstances. The trade bill overemphasizes the role of the private sector 
and essentially the role of the market. Archer (1994: 29) argues that an environment ofthis 
type produces Darwinian consequences.25 In such a setting, US multinational corporations 
would gain an upper hand and lead to greater foreign control of the Southern African region 
and consequently affect the region'S capacity to trade effectively. Martin (1998: 532) 
observes that these fears by the region have already been articulated by South Africa which 
- -finds the trade bill's provisions inadequate and therefore unacceptable. 
However, as the key regional player, South Africa should issue a specific statement and make 
specific recommendations regarding the trade bill. This will be necessary not only because it 
will indicate the general direction of South Africa's foreign policy on trade matters but also 
because it will strengthen the region's image as one cohesive unit. SADC has raised its 
concern regarding the unilat~ral authority the trade bill confers to the US in terms of 
determining all the eligibility criteria for participation in the trade bill's'programs of aid and 
cooperation (SADC 1997: 3). SADC's position favours an approach of genuine partnership in 
which such eligibility is a matter for joint discussion and agreement (SADC 1997: 3) . 
.. 
24From an economist's perspective, the term "Washington C<msensus" refers to a cluster of policy ideas claimed 
by Western industrialized governments to constitute a model for good economic and political management. Th~ame ideas 
are referred to as "good governance" from a political perspective. Irrespective of the perspective used, it is argued (Archer 
1994: 8) that the ideas advance a highly market driven competitive model which favours the strong against the weak in terms 
of technology, education, politics, economics, finances and so forth. 
25The term is used here to amplifY the argument that entirely market driven approaches in economic management 
have a huge potential to marginalise the poor and least well endowed states. That is, weak competitors (when these are 
states) will fail if major decisions are not taken to mitigate their weakness. 
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Despite such pronouncements by SADC as a group, the centrality of South Africa in the 
region as the leading economy requires a separate statement by itself which reinforces the 
joint regional position on such an important issue. The point in this is that the search for the 
type of political economy (for example, social market economy within a democratic setting) 
-: r 
that would be appropriate for Southern Africa in terms of its specific needs and 
circumstances, is a project that should greatly involve the strongest economy in the region. 
This is consistent with part of the argument in this thesis that deeper and constructive 
involvement of South Africa in the region is a critical prerequisite for more effective 
participation of the region in the global economy. 
As stated, the US vision for Africa is to promote democracy and prosperity as well as its own 
national interest. Yet, as the bill's conditionalities reveal, both democracy and prosperity in 
Southern Africa would be threatened if the bill were to be implemented in its present form. 
The bIll's conditionalities, seen as an extension of the liberalization agenda (political and 
economic), a global objective in which the US plays a pivotal role, presents an important 
reason of the need for strong developmental and democratic states26 in Southern Africa. 
There is a tendency to think of strong developmental states in terms of dirigiste authpritarian 
states. While this may have been true of most ofthe Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in 
South East Asia, it is still possible to have strong developmental democracies in Africa and 
certainly in Southern Africa. 
This thinking is premised onthe understanding as Fitoussi (1997: 152) has argued, that 
capitalism in its extreme form disappeared more than fifty years ago and is replaced 
everywhere, including in the US, by "middle ways". These "middle ways" Fitoussi (1997: 
152) further argues, have been the progressive introduction of institutions destined to mitigate 
the excesses of the fr~e market. To be sure, Fitoussi (1997: 152) further argues, the capitalism 
that we know is "contaminated" by the concern for justice and social welfare that springs 
26The concept of strong developmental democracies as used here refers to what is termed as the degree of social-
political cohesion (Buzan 1991: 97). Perceived in this sense, these are governing units with potential to provide the 
framework within which the fragile democracies in Southern Africa can cope with the demands of complex economic and 
political relations both in the domestic as well as in the internationl sphere. The argument is that strong and stable 
democracies are necessary as security stabilizing structures for effective international trade and investment. 
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from the spontaneous functioning of democracy. This conception accepts the regulatory role 
of the state in a market economy and it is a view that has gained widespread support even 
within World Bank circles. As Greenaway and Milner (1993: 58) point out, the essence of 
state regulation is to ensure that policy is fundamentally directed at market augmentation and 
-< 
not market replacement. Strong developmental democracies such as those in the Scandinavian 
countries (social market democracies) have directed state intervention toward market 
augmentation and have achieved growth, development and reasonable levels of equality. 
SADC states are not only seeking efficient export-led growth through sustainable trade and 
investment, but also aim for equality and social justice as critical bases for development. 
Their long-term objective to develop common political values, systems and institutions 
(Article 5 (b) ofSADC Treaty) is part of this process. In this regard it is worthwhile to note 
that democracy and rule of law is one of the guiding principles of SADC (Article 4 (c) of 
SADC Treaty). Because of South Africa's presence in the subregion (as Africa's strongest 
economy and democracy), Southern Africa can be seen as both an emerging market and 
- -democracy. This calls for a workable relationship between a free market economy and 
democracy as an important goal. The conditionalities contained in the US billfor A:frica, 
especially the cut on public expenditure, tend to frustrate rather than complement this goal. 
For instance, it is argued (Fitoussi: 1997: 159) that in a liberal democracy public expenditure 
is a decisive element in the social contract as it is biased towards projects such as education 
and health, which promote justice and equal opportunity. Seen from another perspective, it is 
. ~ - . 
also argued (Fitoussi 1997:}58) that public investment expenditure especially on education, 
research and development, health and infrastructure has a knock-on effect in terms of the 
efficient functioning of the private sector. These are elements of efficiently working 
developmental democracy in the tradition of social market economy practised with a fair 
amount of success ip Germany and the Nordic countries. 
-, 
Even irrespective ofthe label, it would appear that this is the form of political economy that is 
suitable for Southern Africa (a region steeped in politico-socio-economic inequalities) 
because it makes inclusion its basis. As Karlsson (1998: 25) has put it, "a social market 
economy integrates social policy into overall policy and nurtures institutions at all levels to 
provide the framework for an efficient market. As a goal for Southern Africa, export-led 
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growth with equity is more likely to be achieved within a framework of regional democracies 
with social market economies. This objective is fully consistent with SADC objectives and 
would sufficiently contain external pressures and globalization shocks by moderating them to 
fit local circumstances. 
Apartheid policies engendered gross inequalities in all spheres of life in South Africa as well 
as in the region because of the historical economic links. Because ofthis, South Africa, as 
the undisputed regional leader, has responsibility to ensure that genuine SADC partnership 
with external actors allows for alternative choices of economic policies that are appropriate 
for Southern Africa. As the hope and promise for Africa, South Africa must first be able to 
demonstrate capacity for leadership in the sub-region. One way to do this is to use its 
resources, including its current goodwill as a result ofthe remarkable democratic transition, 
to lead the sub-region in its partnerships with powerful external actors. 
Commenting on African countries cooperation with the rich and more developed countries, 
-
Karlsson (1998: 23) outlines some important aspects of meaningful partnerships as follows: 
explicitness about shared values (for instance, respect for democracy, rule of law a~9. human 
rights); transparency in interests so that where these diverge (as they may for good reason) 
common ground can still be found and deals made; and equality of capacity so that parties 
are, to the extent possible, in equal command of all the issues in a contractual 
arrangement. 
Emphasis especially of respect for democracy, rule of law and humarrrights will help 
eradicate widespread corruption in most African countries. This will also have a positive 
effect in strengthening regional social market economies. Leadership by South Arica will help 
to strengthen civil.society in the subregion. A strengthened civil society would in turn lead to 
the development a democratic culture and stable gOvernments. As Karlsson (1998: 24) 
argues, a strong civil society and a democratic culture will be a factor in creating economic 
progress and not a result of it. Therefore, priority is for economic partnerships that 
simultaneously seek to strengthen civil society and democratic culture in Southern Africa. 
Since this objective is also consistent with the US vision for Africa to promote democracy 
and prosperity, the US will be hard pressed not to engage in genuine and meaningful 
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partnership with Southern Africa. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the current US policy towards Africa and the apparent 
opportunities within it likely to be of benefit to SADC states. Of particular note, this policy is 
intended to promote democracy and prosperity in Africa. In part, the policy is attributable to 
~- ~ 
the new international environment now free of Cold War conflict. From the examination of 
the policy, it is clear that while it is an Africa-wide policy, specific African countries and 
regions stand to benefit from it more than others. For instance, a series of high-level trade 
contacts between the US and South Africa on the one hand and the US and SADC on the 
othe,r demonstrates that Southern Africa is well positioned to negotiate beneficial trade deals 
with the US. Here then lies the opportunities. In this regard, the US Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act is seen as an important milestone in US Africa policy. However, further 
examination of the US Africa policy especially within the context of the Africa Growth and 
- ~--
Opportunity Act reveals that the central consideration is the furtherance of the US national 
interest seen as the promotion of market capitalism and democracy on a global-scale.:ItTs a 
reform-oriented policy seeking the integration of African economies into the world economy 
but in ways that worsen the trade and economic prospects for African countries. 
As a response to this situation, it has been argued that the case for a regional response within 
the SADC cooperative structure remains a powerful option. This conception is partly 
informed by the stated fact that international trade exchanges remain a complex network of 
economic and political bargains involving unequal partners. As such, the interests of the weak 
partners, in this case the Southern African states, will best be served by coordination of their 
trade foreign policies..to form joint positions on specific issues. It is suggested that this 
approach be adopted by SADC states in their response to the conditionalities posed by the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. 
On the part of SADC states, merely presenting coordinated joint positions on specific trade 
matters will not constitute a sufficient strategy for confronting US conditionalities. A more 
holistic approach, it is suggested, should include embracing a form of market capitalism as 
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well as democracy. Because of serious inequalities in Southern Africa as a result of apartheid 
and other historical circumstances, developmental democracies in the tradition of social 
market economy appear to be the most appropriate approach. This is the organizational 
framework, in political and economic terms, that has the best chance of addressing important 
-: r 
development issues such as education, health, promotion of justice and equal opportunity as 
well as efficient functioning of the private sector. At the same time, it will enhance respect for 
democracy, rule oflaw and human rights and therefore greatly influence the~~radication of 
widespread corruption which also pose a threat to efficiency of African economies. Still, for 
SADC states, development in this direction (that is, adoption and internalization of this 
holistic approach) places demands on South Africa to provide regional leadership. 
The tension between the US and African countries over issues of political and economic 
conditionalities appears destined to persist. However, even within this tension, the US is 
nevertheless keen to be seen as a cooperating partner sensitive to the development needs of 
African countries. As stated, Democratic US Administrations hav~ traditionally been more 
sympathetic to the African condition. Going by this perception, the current special US interest 
in South Africa and by extension in Southern Africa, provides an opportunity for South 
Africa to lead the region towards meaningful partnerships (informed by shared values and 
transparency in interests) with this important global actor as well as others. The next chapter 
will explore further this widely accepted assumption by assessing critically the level of South 
Africa's commitment to provide such leadership. 
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CHAPTER 6 
South Africa's Regional Foreign Policy: Implications for the Region 
It is widely accepted that South Africa is the natural leader in the Southern African sub 
region. Given the problems currently faced by the region, this places a heavy burden on 
the new post-apartheid state. The set of common problems facing the regitm includes 
unemployment, poverty, massive inequalities, illegal migration, poorly performing 
economies and so forth. These problems pose serious economic threat to the region as 
a whole. At the same time there is great pressure for national economies to conform to 
the liberalization and globalization trends in the global economy. Southern African 
countries genuinely fear exploitation, marginalisation and debt crises. The external 
dimension of the economic threat is therefore the most critical. Southern African region 
must therefore develop political as well as economic capacity to cope with this economic 
threat. Within the framework of SADC, the regional CQuntnes have the objective of 
promoting equitable regional development and sustainable economic growth throlJgh 
industrialisation and trade promotion. They hope to do this by harmonising political and 
socio-economic policies of their individual countries. This is viewed in this study as an 
important prerequisite for coping with the external dimension of the economic threat. 
This chapter focuses on South Africa's regional foreign policy as it seeks to address key . 
threats facing the democratic post apartheid state and the Southern ~frican region as a 
whole. The debate on South Africa's regional foreign policy is briefly assessed in the 
first part of the chapter. In the second part the stated goals of this policy are established 
and assessed within the framework of SADC of which South Africa is part. Policy 
convergence or dwergence in terms of goals and objectives of both South Africa and 
SADC is assessed in the third part. Finally, the stated goals and objectives of South 
Africa's regional foreign policy are evaluated against actual policy decisions and 
implementation. It is argued that for the region to cope with the economic threat posed 
by globalization and liberalization, the role of South Africa as the regional leader will 
be a vital requirement. Further, as a corollary of this, South Africa as the dominant actor 
in the region must reconcile its national and regional interests (by eliminating any 
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contradictions in its regional foreign policy) and minimize the potential for disputes with 
neighbours. 
6.1 The Debate on South Afr}c.a's Regional Foreign Policy 
The debate surrounding the appropriate regional foreign policy orientation for the 
democratic post-apartheid South Africa has been deep and protracted~ -The general 
understanding within this debate is that the new South Africa's regional foreign policy 
should make a decisive break with the past. Some analysts (Evans 1996) have charged 
that the regional foreign policy of the new South Africa is not new as it is dominated 
largely by characteristics of the past. This view would therefore seem to hold that the 
regional foreign policy of the new South Africa is inward -looking, concentrating more 
on national interest narrowly defmed. It can further be construed that the proponents of 
this view suggest that the new South Africa's regional policy preference ordering cares 
little about the considerations for the welfare and general interest of its relatively weaker 
(politically, economically and militarily) neighbours in the Southern Africa subsyste"m. 
Other analysts focus on South African capital as being a very effective instrument of 
foreign policy and particularly at the subregional and continental levels. In this regard, 
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) charge that using structural power, the new 
South African government has adopted a regional foreign policy of export and· 
investment promotion that is fully consistent with the desires of South African capital. 
This, it is implied, is not a new orientation in South Africa's regional foreign policy as 
it represents continuity with past policies. However, some commentators (Black and 
Swatuk 1997) believe that the regional foreign policy of the post apartheid state 
represents both continuity and change, while at the same time suggesting that a holistic 
.. 
approach to the South African regional policy sh~uld take cognizance of the rote of 
non-state actors such as South African business corporations. 
The debate on South Africa's regional foreign policy notwithstanding, the institution of 
SADC brings Southern African countries together to form a regime network capable of 
addressing the regional threats and opportunities on a single multilateral framework. This 
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is a particularly relevant development as it reflects a general trend whereby regional 
states are seeking cooperative outcomes especially in economic affairs. Faced with the 
threats of marginalisation arising from globalization and liberalization trends in the 
global economy, there is a need for the poor and weak SADC economies to 
-: r 
counterbalance such threats by developing appropriate regional responses. In this regard 
one can expect that the foreign policy of the strongest regional state will reflect such 
concerns by being purposive and coherent. 
6.2 South Africa's Stated Regional Foreign Policy Goals: Principles, Objectives 
and Priorities 
Whatever the actual or observable foreign policy actions of the post apartheid state have 
been to date, policy pronouncements by key foreign policy actors have been consistent 
in terms of showing a decisive break with the past. This has been heralded as a necessary 
and also very important development (VanWyk 1994). As L€l-Pere and Van Nieuwkerk 
(1999: 202) have noted, another development has been the formulation and planningpf 
foreign policy principles and priorities by a range of mUltiple actors. These include 
among others, the president, the vice president, the foreign minister, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DF A), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the parliament, 
trade and foreign affairs parliamentary committees and so forth. Policy input and 
decision implementation has therefore become broader and more transparent. 
Henwood (1997: 7) has noted that as early as August 1994, the foreign minister 
pronounced some foreign policy guidelines that included: centrality of South Africa's 
national interest in all policy matters; that South Africa should increase its participation 
in regional, continental and global multilateral organisations and that economic stability 
and regional cooperation were fundamental principles in South Africa's foreign policy. 
Henwood (1997:7) further notes that the minister also declared five foreign policy 
priorities that included promotion of economic development in Southern Africa and 
constructive interaction with Africa. These pronouncements indicate the early signs that 
South Africa perceives the region to be of central importance to itself. Venter (1998: 11) 
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notes that this perception is also reflected in DFA circles where South Africa's first 
priority is seen to be the Southern African region first, followed and closely linked with 
the rest of the continent. 
In fact, in the view of other analysts, the early prognosis of a democratic South Africa's 
regional foreign policy orientation suggested (Van Wyk 1994: 86) the existence of the 
political will to playa more benevolent and constructive role in the regiou.~ A benevolent 
and constructive role meant (VanWyk 1994: 86) an orientation as regional leader, 
pursuing a facilitator role for the negotiation of a more equitable regional economy and 
a regional security regime. Van Wyk (1994: 86) states that a democratic South Africa's 
foreign policy orientation as a regional leader would, in a cooperative environment, lead 
to the development of a regional strategy to attract foreign aid, investment and trade. 
The policy bearing of this orientation is clearly the generally accepted view that the 
destiny of South Africa is inextricably linked to that of ~e ~oJlthern Africa region. In 
order to give real effect and substance to this view, it is imperative that South Afric~' s 
regional foreign policy be specific and coherent in this regard. Attempts by Sbuth Africa 
to stay on course in this policy dimension has been, as Black and Swatuk (1997: 36) 
observe, the repeated professed intent (by the new policy elite) to create a new form of 
economic interaction in the region based on principles of mutual benefit and 
interdependence. It is expected that once the structures for the new form of economiC . 
interaction are put in place, a relatively equitable regional economic growth would be the 
result instead of the situation where South Africa is an island of prosperity surrounded 
by a sea of poverty. Clearly this view is informed by the realisation that the historical 
injustices in the region and the serious inequities they engendered (both a legacy of 
apartheid and colonialism) pose a major threat to regional stability. Equally important, 
.. 
a region characterised by defects of uneven development is least able to cope with the 
current pressures of economic globalization and liberalization. 
These perceptions have also shaped policy view III another important circle of 
government establishment. The DTI is acutely aware of the nature of South African 
trade with the region. This remains highly skewed in South Africa's favour. Nkuhlu 
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(1997: 79) observes that South African exports have been rising very sharply and that 
imports from the region are virtually stagnant. It is insightful to note that this observation 
is made by Mfundo Nkuhlu, himself the chief director of African Bi-Iateral Trade 
Relations at DTI. The DTI therefore accepts that a serious structural defect exists in 
": r 
South Africa's economic relationship with the region. On the basis ofthis understanding 
and perhaps more as part of broad policy formulation and planning within DTI, it appears 
that South Africa is keen on correcting this structural defect. 
Commenting on this issue, Nkuhlu (1997: 80) states that the South African government 
seeks to restructure its relations with other SADC states along the following parameters: 
creation of an asymmetrical free trade arrangement in Southern Africa; recognition of 
variable speeds in the dismantling of barriers to trade (South Africa to dismantle more 
barriers and at a faster rate than its weaker neighbours); and promotion of new 
investment in infrastructure and the productive sector. It would be expected that if 
implemented, such an arrangement would allow for inflows of~outh African technology 
- c..-
and capital to the region. That is, inflows in a: more beneficial manner and not simply 
using SADC states as captive markets for manufactured South African products: This 
in turn would boost regional productive capacity, promote SADC exports and make 
SADC states more competitive and better able to integrate with the global economy. 
According to Nkuhlu (1997: 81), the vision of South African government can be . 
identified within the following objectives: attainment of the highest possible level of 
regional economic development that can integrate well into the' global economy; 
promotion of sustainable growth and development on the basis of balance, equity and 
mutual benefit; and the promotion of deeper economic cooperation and integration as the 
basis for more effective restructuring and participation of the region in the global 
.. 
economy. Nkuhlu (1997: 81) further clarifies that the conceptual basis of this vision is 
the coming to terms with at least two important facts as follows: first, that South Africa's 
own best interest (national interest) in growth and development is best pursued within a 
Southern African region that is characterised by relative growth and stability; second, 
that the existing trade relations are unsustainable. 
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While the new South Africa has made Africa the central focus of its foreign policy 
(Muller 1997: 65), Southern Africa commands top priority in South Africa's foreign 
policy (Nkuhlu 1997: 82). This observation implies that South Africa is keen on using 
the SADC cooperative regime, in a deliberate and purposive effort to coordinate its 
economic policies with other SADC states for mutual gain. One of the overriding 
concerns is stated as the objective of effectively integrating Southern African region into 
the global economy. The further implication of this is that given its relative-strength in 
all dimensions, South Africa is prepared to defend and advance regional trade interests 
in multilateral platforms and other fora. 
While this is not to suggest that South Africa's regional foreign policy will become an 
extension of its general foreign policy, it can be argued that the more the latter is driven 
by regional circumstances, the greater will be regional development and stability. The 
corollary of this is that it is in South Africa's best national interest. The stated principles, 
objectives and priorities of South Africa's regional foreign ~olicy so far seem to agree 
with this view. 
6.3 The Views of Policy Makers and Scholars in Southern Africa: Convergence 
or Divergence? 
South Africa's regional policy particularly on trade and investment issues and generally 
on economic development of the region remains a topical issue within the region and 
outside of it. There are some fears that South Africa will simply overwhelm its 
neighbours and subject them to a form of economic imperialism (McGowan and 
Ahwireng-Obeng 1998). Other scholars (Solomon 1997;Black and Swatuk 1997) have 
-" 
viewed the post-apartheid state's legitimate involvement in the region as creating a 
window of opportunity for the entire region. It is therefore important to visit the views 
of the policy makers in the region in order to gain some insight of the general thinking 
on the issue. 
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First, it is important to note that in an Article 4 (d) ofSADC Treaty, members states are 
called upon to act in accordance with the principle of equity, balance and mutual benefit 
(SADC Treaty 1992). Inter alia, the Treaty further state~ in article 5(h) that SADC shall 
promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of member 
-: r 
states as part of the actions necessary for achieving the objective of development and 
economic growth in the region (SADC Treaty 1992:). Clearly, these are important 
guideposts as to how member states are expected to conduct their affairs
r 
ang. especially 
where this has potential for impact on other members. As such, South Africa's regional 
and general foreign policy of trade and investment is expected to take cognizance of 
these guideposts. Evidence is legion that a policy direction conforming to these guide 
posts had been articulated early enough by the African National Congress (ANC) at the 
time in the transition period when it had become apparent that it was a government in 
waiting. 
The ANC view, Venter (1998: 4) observes, stated that_Solltp. Africa has inextricable 
links with Southern Africa and as such post-apartheid regional economic relations must 
avoid exacerbating inequities. This view also specifically stated (Venter 1998: 5)that 
South Africa will accept its regional responsibilities on the basis of mutual respect and 
cooperation and resist any temptation to pursue its own interests at the expense of those 
of the subregion. If implemented, such a policy would assign to South Africa the role as 
partner and benevolent hegemony in Southern Africa. 
South Africa has also been described as a middle power. As a theoretical construct, 
Solomon (1997: 54) notes that middle powers are found in the middle rank of material 
capabilities both military and economic and that they seek to bolster international 
institutions for c~operative management. It is argued (Solomon 1997: 54) that middle 
powers maximize their own interest as they pursue the general interest. It is ij,lrther 
argued (Solomon 1997: 54) that policy makers in the middle powers perceive for their 
state the role of a regional or subregional leader in a variety of issue settings and 
generally as a bridge or mediator and manager. As manager, it is argued (Solomon 
1997:54) that a middle power would be involved in a broad capacity of facilitating not 
only institution-building (that is, formal organisations and regimes such as SADC) but 
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also development of conventions and norms. It is possible to argue that SADC leaders 
perceived such a leadership role for South Africa when they requested the new 
democratic state to chair the institution of SADC. To be sure, the bottom line suggests 
that leadership must come with certain respq~ibilities. So far the political elite in the 
South African government has indicated (at least by way of rhetoric) its awareness of 
this important fact. 
The former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, has argued (Schneider 1992: 38) 
that in today's world, economic power should mean leadership not dominance both in 
the Southern African region as well as in global affairs. Stressing the importance of 
interaction within a framework of clearly defined principles, Masire believes (Schneider 
1992: 38) that as long as the rights of smaller members in SADC are protected within a 
set of rules agreed by all, there is little risk of dominance. This is evidence of a policy 
orientation that places faith in SADC as a cooperative framework capable of 
harmonising the interests of its members including tho~e qL South Africa as a new 
SADC member. It is also evidence of trust in multilateral ism as the way forward for the 
region in terms of meeting regional as well as international challenges. 
Yet this is not to suggest that SADC is unaware of South Africa's overall strength in all 
dimensions. The former executive secretary of SADC, Kaire Mbuende, has pointed out 
(Novicki 1994: 47) that South Africa stands to benefit from a larger regional market since 
its manufactures are always going to be dominant in the regional markets. However, he 
places more emphasis (Novicki 1994: 47) on the potential for mutually beneficial 
relations between South Africa and the region in a new formal arrangement under 
SADC. The expectation here is that while the new South Africa is going to benefit 
greatly from its repewed interaction with the region, the SADC states in tum expect new 
opportunities from a reformed apartheid state. For' instance, because oftheir support for 
the struggle against apartheid, the regional states suffered greatly from acts of economic 
sabotage and general destabilization in the hands of apartheid state's military machine. 
Consequently, some analysts (Ajulu 1995: 52) have argued that there are expectations on 
the part of South Africa's neighbours to see that South Africa recognises this "debt". 
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Recognition of South Africa's "debt" to the region may come in a number of ways and 
not least the halting of attempts by South Africa, directly or indirectly, to exploit 
historical regional imbalances. As Bischoff and Southall (1999: 156) observe, the 
neighbours expect the new South Africa to be able to contribute to the stability needed 
-:. r 
for growth and simultaneously provide the markets, investment and skills to support 
development in the sub region. So far, on the basis of stated regional policy objectives, 
it may be said that the political will committing South Africa to a more active and 
beneficial role in the region has been well documented in policy pronouncements even 
by very key players. This can be summed up by Mandela's pronouncement: 
No longer shall South Africa be the fountainhead 
of our neighbour's woes. No longer shall South Africa's 
government operate in isolation without due recognition 
of our neighbours interests (Shubin 1995: 9). 
It appears that policy makers in the region have similar beliefs and objectives about what 
needs to be done. This means convergence more than divergence and it is a useful 
..... -:..;...~ 
starting point in the search for regional solutions for sustainable trade and development. 
It is also evidence of South Africa's change rather than continuity (at least at the policy 
rhetorical level) of its regional trade and investment policy. The central objective in the 
region is clearly that of achieving development and economic growth. This is expected 
to be achieved through increased investment and industrialisation in the region. In turn 
this will enable SADC states to trade more effectively at the intra-regional level and. 
more importantly, increase competitiveness as well as expand extra-regional trade. 
Economic viability in turn will become security for stability in the region as it will 
improve chances for the survival of democracy and protection and promotion of human 
rights. In view of this, policy pronouncements must be measured against actual 
developments on !he ground. 
6.4 Actual Foreign Policy Implementation and General Direction of South 
Africa's Trade and Investment Policies 
On the basis of actual behaviour, South Africa's attitude towards the region appears to 
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be characterised by ambiguity. The very visible rhetoric of its professed commitment 
to be supportive of regional goals does not seem to be matched by evidence of practical 
enthusiasm for economic cooperation. Black and Swatuk (1997: 43) blame this on the 
fact that despite the challenges and opportunities of regional relations, South Africa's 
~ :: r 
immediate interests seem to be better served by the current regional economic status quo. 
It is necessary therefore to cite a couple of examples in which South Africa's professed 
commitment to support and provide leadership to the region appears ambiguous. 
-- - -"* 
The issues surrounding the SADC trade protocol signed in August 1996 provide an 
important example of South Africa's apparent ambivalence to regional needs. The trade 
protocol aims to achieve a fully integrated common market by 2004 within the larger 
SADC framework. It aims to complement the overall regional objectives of increased 
investment and industrialisation as well as competitiveness and overall economic growth. 
For instance, both industrialisation and competitiveness can be expanded by relocation 
of some of South Africa's industries to other SADC states with much lower production 
-- ..;;.... ~ 
costs. This would also create spin-offs and allow for diversification to begin to take 
place in the region. 
Despite the protocol's potential for advancing development in the region, there has been 
little progress associated with it. The key problem is the fact that the protocol has yet to 
come into force and South Africa for its part has not yet ratified it (McGowan and 
Ahwireng-Obeng 1998:_185)~ All protocols under SADC require ratification by two 
thirds of the organisation's membership. Out of the total of eight protocols already 
negotiated by SADC member states, South Africa has ratified only one while Botswana 
has ratified all eight of them (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998: 185). As the 
country expecte~ to lead the region towards more cooperative and constructive 
engagement locally and internationally, the lukewalm approach by South Africa, on the 
issue of ratification of protocols can only mean that it seeks to maximize its own narrow 
self interest since maintenance of the status quo works to its advantage. 
Further, McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 184) argue, the trade protocol does 
not provide for differential treatment for the least developed member states and 
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provisions for equitable industrial development in the region are inadequate. South 
Africa's relations with the BNLS states (South Africa's SACU partners) have generated 
additional ambiguities over its overall regional policy. In this regard, McGowan and 
Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 182) cite South Afri9a.' s unilateralism in the case where in 1995 
it cancelled a SACU treaty provision which allowed BNLS states to import from outside 
SACU raw materials for textile products destined for South African markets. The 
objective, McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 182) observe, was to protect inefficient 
South African producers of the same raw materials despite protestations from SACU 
members that South African supplies were inferior and could not meet delivery 
schedules. It is obvious from this that such behaviour by the strongest regional state does 
not augur well for regional development efforts. This behaviour clearly frustrates the 
dynamics of regional comparative advantage. The losers in this particular case are 
obviously the BNLS textile manufacturers and the other SADC suppliers of higher 
quality, cost-effective raw materials. Disregarding the shorter-term gain by South 
African raw material producers (made possible in t1!isparticular case by unfair 
intervention) the longer term loss is to the region as a whole because of attempts by South 
Africa to perpetuate uneconomic dependencies. 
Disputes with neighbours also exist especially with Zimbabwe and Botswana. There is 
serious tension in the case of Zimbabwe over unequal trade skewed hugely in favour of 
South Africa. According to McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 187), tensiun· 
mounted in 1992 when .South Africa imposed high tariffs on Zimbabwean goods 
following the lapse of 1964 bilateral preferential trade agreement. This tension has 
persisted and has resulted into a low key trade war between the two countries in the face 
of failure to renegotiate the lapsedbi-lateral arrangement. Goods such as textiles and 
garments in which .. Zimbabwehas competitive advantage face up to ninety percent import 
duty in the South African market. With Botswan'a~ a member of SACU, the dispute 
involves demands from South Africa that the semi-built Hyundai cars assembled in 
Botswana should not enjoy "local status" under the customs union when they enter the 
South African market (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998: 183). 
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Other disputes include accusations being levelled against South Africa for allegedly 
instituting measures to hamper new industrial projects in Namibia, Lesotho and 
Swaziland as a measure to prevent competition from them (McGowan and Ahwireng-
Obeng 1998: 83). Whatever the merits in all these disputes, it is possible to argue that 
-; r 
they place serious strains on regional relations and raise serious questions about South 
Africa's regional foreign policy. The further implication ofthis is that it leaves the region 
fragmented and least able to cope with the economic threat posed by glpbalization and 
liberalisation trends. 
On the other hand it may be that South Africa's behaviour is simply conforming to that 
typical of a semi-peripheral state in terms of world systems theory.27 As argued, 
(McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998: 168-169), because of economic and 
technological superiority, the core exploits the semi-periphery through trade and 
investment and for the same reason and in a similar manner the semi-periphery exploits 
the periphery. Within this conception core states will ally_the£1$elves with South Africa 
by allowing it to enforce the regional economiC and political status quo. However, it can 
be argued that as the regional hegemon with middle power status, it will be up to Sbuth 
Africa itself and how it defines national and regional interest, to choose how it will 
balance external pressures (to conform to certain standards) with regional needs for 
economic development, growth and stability as long term goals. 
There are other equally conspicuous examples of South Africa's contradictions of its 
regional posture as a cooperating partner. Following the successful political 
transformation in 1994, South Africa's trade with its neighbours expanded drastically 
with high trade balances in its favour. McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 166) have 
27 As a structuralist theoretical construct of international political economy, world systems theory 
identifies a core, periphery and semi-periphery as distinct spheres of economic activity within the 
world economy. The core is technologically advanced and produces high technology goods. The 
periphery produces mainly low-wage agricultural and mineral primary commodities. The semi-
periphery possesses characteristics of both the core and the periphery and is the crucial point for the 
reproduction of the world system. South Africa occupies this semi-periphery sphere. It can choose to 
behave as a partner for mutual growth and development within SADe structures or alternatively 
choose to pursue predominantly national interest at the expense of regional renewal and longterm 
stability. 
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noted that South Africa's economy is about four times larger than that of Southern Africa 
combined and that South Africa's exports to its neighbours are approximately seven 
times larger than its imports from them. They have argued (1998: 166) that these trade 
imbalances coupled with South Africa's reluctance to open its markets to regional 
-:. r 
imports have raised fears of regional domination by South Africa. At the same time 
there has been a major thrust of investment in the region by South African business 
corporations. 
The neighbours' fears might be justified because as Black and Swatuk (1997: 40) argue, 
the greater proportion of South Africa's economic thrust into the region represents the 
pursuit of new markets for trade (hence the huge trade imbalance in its favour) as 
opposed to opportunities for longer term investments with the potential of benefiting the 
neighbours. The indication generally, as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) have 
argued, is that the overall scenario is one that simply underlines South Africa's 
hegemonic domination of the region directed by its own ~el~.sb national interest. Black 
and Swatuk (1997: 42) charge that it is such regional developments that have caused 
South African interests, private and government, to be lukewarm in their approach to 
reform and re-negotiation of regional trading and investment arrangements. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the assumption that South Africa is well positioned to provide 
political as well as economic leadership to the region. To test this assumption South 
Africa's regional foreign policy, in terms of its principles, objectives and priorities was 
assessed within the context of SADC's stated objectives. This assessment reveals that 
a regional consen~us prevails regarding priority issues. However, convergence at the 
policy pronouncement level requires a corresponding convergence at the policy 
implementation level. This too was assessed in order to establish South Africa's level 
of commitment to bolster the region's capacity to engage more effectively in the global 
economy. A prerequisite of this being the need for South Africa to facilitate a sustainable 
and mutually beneficial regional development. 
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Despite policy pronouncements that favour mutual and beneficial regional trade 
relations, South Africa's actual behaviour towards the region reveal a totally different 
picture. It fails to support the enhancement of equitable regional development and 
economic growth through industrialisation, apd trade promotion, a key regional 
objective around which consensus prevails. The image that is coming through depicts 
South Africa in a dilemma regarding how to conduct its relations with the region. This 
dilemma is highly visible in the trade disputes between itself and key regional actors 
such as Zimbabwe and Botswana. It is also visible in South Africa's disputes with BNLS 
states in 1995 regarding the importation of cost effective raw materials (from non-SACU 
SADC states) for textile products destined for the South African market. Amidst these 
disputes South Africa has continued to pursue an aggressive economic policy in search 
of new markets in the region resulting in unsustainable trade imbalances in its favour. 
At the same time, it has failed to ratify the trade protocol of 1996 and has shown great 
reIuctance to open its markets to regional imports. 
Within South Africa itself, the promotion of economic growth, development and job 
creation must remain important policy priorities. This is important for consolidation of 
democracy. Yet South Africa cannot pursue this objective at the expense of the region 
as this amounts to short-term to medium-term narrow and therefore selfish calculation 
of interest. In any case, pursing this narrow objective will exacerbate historical 
economic imbalances between South Africa and its neighbours and lead to further . 
tension and instability. Sjnce coping with global economic liberalisation requires a 
strong regional platform such as SADC on which to articulate and implement joint 
positions on issues, the evidence oftense regional relations poses difficulty in achieving 
this objective. Further, tense relations in the region hamper progress in other areas 
where extra-region!ll contacts between SADC and external actors are needed. 
The lesson that emerges from the tense regional relations engendered by South Africa's 
regional foreign policy behaviour is that the first step toward tackling the external 
economic threat must be regional economic harmony and stability. This implies a 
responsibility on the part of South Africa to find constructive and innovative ways to 
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balance national with regional interests. This will pave the way for finding j oint regional 
solutions necessary for coping and integrating effectively within the global economy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
The thesis set out to explore the more general question regarding the ability or otherwise of 
SADC states to relate effectively (that is, in a manner more beneficial to Southern Africa) on 
matters of trade and related issues with a select group of economically rich. and powerful 
Northern industrialized states. For that purpose EU and US were used as the focal point for 
illumination. The discourse was premised on two assumptions. The first purported that for 
Southern Africa the present security threats in the form of negative trade balances, economic 
dependence, poverty, unemployment, poor economic growth rates, poor health-care, illiteracy, 
debt crises, economic disparities and so forth are exacerbated by the external threat in the form 
of unbridled market capitalism. The corollary ofthis first assumption was that SADC states are 
capabie of effectively integrating their economies through trade and related arrangements with 
the dominant external actors in the global economy. The se~on£Lassumption held that South 
Africa possesses both the requisite resources as well as the political will to provide the needed 
regional leadership for effective integration of the region with the global economy. . 
In the assessment of these assumptions the concept of regime theory was applied to provide 
insight on interstate relations in the interdependent post-Cold War era. Examination of the 
concept demonstrates that cooperation among and between states in the anarchic international 
system is still possible. Post-apartheid and post..,Cold War contexts present partiCUlarly conducive 
environments for the achievement of various forms cooperation. The demise of communism has 
meant emergence of a Liberal International Economic Order which largely ameliorates the 
condition of anarchy by elevating the concept of reciprocity in an increasingly interdependent 
world. Obstacles to co~peration as posed by the realist conception of states as relative-gains and 
short-term self interest maximizers have substantially disappeared. As such, affairs of states are 
increasingly conducted within an expanded security agenda which places socio-economic issues 
(low politics) on an equal footing with military-security issues (high politics). Cooperative 
regimes as governance structures have emerged to mediate between state relations in their pursuit 
of state welfare to maximize absolute gains through collective effort. It is against this backdrop 
that regionalism as an organizing concept has emerged at one level and region to region relations 
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at another level. Intra-SADC as well as extra-SADC relations take place within this 
understanding. 
Colonial, sub-colonial and apartheid structures and policies progressively had posed the greatest 
threat to security and stability of Southern African region. Despite this and partly because of it, 
a cooperative culture in the region nevertheless emerged. Today, in an ironic twist of history, the 
democratic post-apartheid state represents the greatest hope for the security ~d.stabi1ity of the 
region as new threats become more urgent. This is expected to be achieved through its 
constructive involvement in the region as a partner and in the context of extra-regional trade 
relations within SADC framework. For instance, the unique TDCA signed between South Africa 
and EU demonstrates the importance EU attaches to its relations with South Africa. The 
agreement includes the farm sector (a sector fiercely protected by EU and not included in similar 
agreements with the Mediterranean countries) and features of asymmetry and differentiation in 
consideration of the parties' different levels of development. The importance of this is that a 
similar arrangement between SADC and the EU is currently being discussed as part of the 
"- ..;....~ 
proposed Regional Economic Partnership Agreements meant to succeed the Lome Convention 
which expires February 2000. The role of South Africa in such an agreement will be instrumental 
for SADC states in terms of providing requisite bargaining and negotiating skills for joint SADC 
positions. In the context of this understanding South Africa also declares that its neighbours are 
crucial to its longterm stability as well as that of the region. 
The examination of the current global economic context within which SADC trade relations 
with EU and US take place reveals that it is a hostile environment for weak and fragile 
democracies such as those comprising SADC states. The demise of communism and the 
paradigm shift towards greater focus on economic issues has meant dominance of market 
capitalism in global economic relations. This new order is characterized by donor fatigue and 
-" 
decline in real spending on development assistance.-' Simultaneously, trade and not aid is 
emphasized as a new theme. Within the context of the new US-Africa policy, the US has 
increased the pressure for the linkage between trade and investments cooperation arrangements 
with politico-economic reforms. Such conditionalities characterize the ostensibly innovative US 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Evidence of extensive failure of the Lome Convention to 
improve trade prospects of the Southern African ACP associates mean that new SADC 
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cooperative arrangements with EU and US cannot be modelled on it. Still, the overwhelming 
importance of external trade as a means for economic progress suggest that SADC states should 
seek to engage and integrate with the world economy as this option still offers a degree of 
political and economic choice. 
The thesis has argued that using SADC as a regional framework for negotiations, SADC states 
can conduct a coordinated trade foreign policy where regional positions CJf~ elaborated and 
adopted. This will mean a pooling or sharing of sovereignty whereby it is enhanced by the action 
of diminishing it. In other words, states will agree to surrender certain competences for the sake 
of strengthening a collective regional position aimed at achieving a specific objective in a 
specific issue area. It was argued that the correlate of this argument is that both weak and strong 
states are brought together in a cooperative arrangement by certain economic interests. In the case 
ofEU-SADC cooperation, EU perceives certain interests by wishing to enter into a post-Lome 
arrangement with SADC states. Similarly, the recent high level US-SADC contacts leading to 
a US-SADC Forum in April 1999 demonstrates the perception by US of certain interests to be 
.... ...;.... ~ 
pursued in Southern Africa. 
Within the context of perceived reciprocal benefits, SADC states are therefore in a position to 
enhance cooperation efficiency with these dominant actors. Both EU and US greatly value the 
democratic political transformation in South Africa as it provides a beacon of hope in the 
subregion and the continent as a whole. This gives South Africa a considerable amount {)f 
international good will and political clout. It was argued that this asset coupled with its position 
as the region's economic powerhouse, South Africa possesses the wherewithal to influence 
positive developments in SADC trade relations with the two dominant actors. 
It was also argued that a critical component of the ability for SADC states to integrate effectively 
.. 
with the global economy is the capacity to institute trade 'and economic policies that reflect local 
circumstances. Given historical dependent development and the distortions engendered by 
apartheid policies, local circumstances demand sustained public investment expenditure on 
education, health, research and development as well as on infrastructure. This has the potential 
to create a workable relationship between a free market economy and democracy. There is at least 
a very strong need for an integrative system that nurtures institutions at all levels to create the 
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requisite foundation for an effective trading region. As the majority of states in the region are 
weak in terms of socio-political cohesion (as well as in economic terms) they need to put in place 
strong developmental democracies in the tradition of social market economy. As the thesis 
argued, this approach has the potential to consoli~ate young democracies since it emphasizes 
respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights, and simultaneously provides the 
institutional framework to mitigate the inescapable insecurities of market-based relations. 
Essentially this approach allows for "strategic" integration with the world economy by guiding 
the market towards planned structural change. This has the potential to enable weak states to 
curve out a middle way because the anarchy of the market should be as undesirable as centrally 
planned economies. The important point to note is that maximizing economic growth through 
effective trade and integration with the dominant actors remains a critical objective for SADC 
states. However, historical patterns of dependent economic development should be gradually 
reduced by approaches that aim to increase the viability of the individual units with a view to 
increaSe collective strength. 
Increasing collective regional strength (a prerequisite for effective positioning on trade m~tters) 
places a heavy demand on South Africa's regional role as leader. South Africa is also faced with 
the task of reconstructing its own social and economic fabric. For South Africa this has meant 
a balancing act to reconcile its national and regional interests. Rhetoric of its regional foreign 
policy has been strong in articulating its regional leadership position and the strategic importance 
of regional renewal and stability. In particular, policy think tanks at DTI identify South Africa's 
vision for the region as involvtng the promotion of sustainable growth and development on the 
basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit. Part of this vision includes the promotion of deeper 
economic cooperation and integration as a basis for more effective participation of the region in 
the global economy. Judged on the basis of rhetoric, South Africa's regional foreign policy is 
principled and possess~s clear objectives and priorities 
South Africa's policy rhetoric on its regional foreign policy has not been matched with 
substantive practical behaviour. Instead it has pursued an aggressive promotion of its 
manufactured products to regional markets and refused to open up its markets to SADC products. 
This has threatened to exacerbate the historical structural defects in its economic relations with 
the region. Serious trade disputes with its neighbours have resulted from this behaviour. 
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South Africa has also failed to demonstrate leadership in the ratification of the various protocols 
under the SADC cooperative framework. This has led to some frustrations in the domain of 
extra-regional contacts. South Africa's behaviour towards the region has been consistent with 
that of a typical semi-peripheral state for its apparent preference of the regional economic status 
~ :. r 
quo. 
On the basis of its foreign policy rhetoric it is clear that South Africa perceiv.es & middle power 
status for itself and a corresponding subregional leadership role. This view is widely shared by 
other actors in the region. However, the general view is that South Africa should demonstrate 
leadership without domination. In precise terms this means a role as a benign hegemon capable 
of many positive actions among which should include influencing states to cohere and uphold 
the norms and principles of SADC cooperative framework. This also means strengthening the 
region's capacity to coordinate participants' policies for joint regional positions in external 
relations. In the absence of this management role of the region's strongest state, there remains 
the possible threat to the survival of SADC as a viable coopera!ive c;.structure. This is represented 
by the fear among South Africa's neighbours that itmight use its dominant position to co~~inue 
pursuing narrow self interest and thereby threaten key SADC principles such assolid~ity and 
security, equity, balance and mutual benefit. Given this fear, South Africa should guard against 
the temptation of becoming a selfish hegemon and a threat to its neighbours and generally to 
regional progress. Until South Africa fmds a sustainable balance between its national and 
regional interests this threat will remain real. Simultaneously, regional capacity to trade- and 
integrate effectively with dominant external actors and generally with the global economy will 
remain compromised. 
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